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This dissertation examines the strategies lobbyists use to influence public policy 
in the agriculture and food policy arena. Previous studies of lobbying have produced 
conflicting evidence for the impact of lobbying on the content of federal laws and 
regulations, despite the fact that, in the domain of agriculture alone, interest groups spent 
over $133,786,278 to lobby the federal government in 2015. Such an investment 
demonstrates that interest groups are confident that their lobbying strategies produce 
tangible benefits for the industries and interests they represent. I argue that an 
organization’s material resources, social connections, and prior experience lobbying in 
Washington determine the strategies they use to achieve their policy goals, and that 
Congressional polarization is increasing the power of interest group influence. Using an 
original dataset, based on hand-coded lobbying disclosure reports, and interviews with 
policy experts and lobbyists, I find clear and compelling evidence that lobbyists 
strategically direct their lobbying efforts to different government venues, depending on 
the nature of their relationship with members of Congress and members of the 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, interest groups with the greatest material resources are not 
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only more likely to lobby, but they are also more effective in their use of these resources 
to leverage their relationships with members of Congress for more efficient lobbying 
efforts. This dissertation is the first work of its kind to uncover the latent reasons driving 
lobbyists to utilize distinct strategies from one another in a policy arena crucial to 
American public health, environmental conservation, and national security. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Today Congress finds itself in a new era of polarization (Rosenthal and Poole 
2015). While many have bemoaned the gridlock of a do-nothing Washington (for 
example see, Blake 2014), interest group lobbying, measured in dollars spent, has risen 
fairly steadily in this environment (Influence & Lobbying 2014). Why is this? Gridlock 
should mean Congress does less, requiring less advocacy from interest groups, and 
considerably less advocacy from corporate interests who tend to prefer the status quo 
(Drutman 2015). Yet, corporations and interest groups appear to be lobbying as much as 
ever, and much more than a decade ago when Congress was considerably less polarized.  
This dissertation looks to lobbying in the Agricultural sector to explain what 
interest groups are doing in Washington, how they’re doing it, and why they’re doing so 
much of it. I argue that polarization is destabilizing long-standing subsystems and 
creating new opportunities for interest group influence; and I find that lobbyists are 
adapting their advocacy strategies to adjust to this new and evolving political 
environment.   
Why look at the agricultural sector, specifically, to explain lobbying strategies? 
From an academic perspective, food and agriculture policy has been a traditional sector 
for subsystem studies (see Browne 1995; Hansen 1991; A. D. Sheingate 2003). From a 
policy perspective, we have seen perverse outcomes from this sector in particular. 
Between 1975 and 2005 the obesity rate has increased from around 20 percent to over 30 
percent, raising the average weight of Americans by about 20 pounds (Dreifus 2012). 
This “obesity epidemic” has its roots in a major change in agricultural policy that 
occurred in the 1970s. During this decade, the government began to encourage farmers to 
produce as much food as possible, instead of paying farmers to limit their production, as 
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had previously been the practice. Simultaneously, the “green revolution” made farms far 
more productive, reducing the cost of food and increasing the number of calories 
available to the average American (Dreifus 2012).  
This obesity epidemic has not affected all Americans equally, however. Low 
wages increase the probability of obesity (Kim and Leigh 2010); in other words, poverty 
and obesity are related. This is because the cheapest calories are those calories that come 
from fast food and highly processed foods. A higher number of calories are now available 
to the average American than previously in history, but they aren’t necessarily desirable 
or nutritious calories. The difference between healthy and unhealthy eating (consuming 
whole grains, fresh meats, fruits, and vegetables, as opposed to fast foods and highly 
processed foods) is about $1.50 per day, which adds up to an additional $550 per year 
(Godoy 2013; Rao et al. 2013). This is not an insignificant barrier to healthy eating for 
low-income individuals and for those on the supplemental nutrition assistance program.  
The relative cost of some calories compared to others, and the resulting obesity 
epidemic, is consequence of a policy infrastructure1 that subsidizes some kinds of foods 
(both monetarily and through policy) and not others. Why is the policy infrastructure that 
produces these distortions so resistant to change, and how did it come resemble its 
current form?  
The answer to this question is that policy is, in large, a result of the interactions 
between policymakers and interest groups,2 particularly those groups who lobby. 
Through a study of agricultural policy, this dissertation asks what lobbying strategies 
interest groups use to achieve their preferred policy outcomes and how political 
environment shapes interactions between lawmakers and lobbyists. Among lobbying 
                                                
1 The specific set of policies that organize society.  
2 I use the terms “interest group(s)” and “interest(s)” interchangeably in this proposal.  
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interests, there is considerable variation in behavior – different groups use different 
strategies. This is true both of an individual lobbying interest group across time, and of 
various interest groups during a single point in time. This variation raises the question: 
how do interest groups decide whom to lobby, Congress or the bureaucracy,3 and why? In 
spite of the vast literature on lobbying, we have surprisingly few answers to this question. 
Answering this question may provide some insight into the ways in which American 
public policy is made and the negotiation process that occurs behind closed doors. 
SIGNIFICANCE  
Recent agricultural policy is weighted heavily toward large producers, highly 
processed foods, and factory farming. In 2012, farms with sales of $1 million or more 
(just 4% of all farms) accounted for 66 percent of all US agricultural products sold (2012 
Census Highlights 2015). This skew to the system has enormous benefits, both monetary 
and policy.4 America is often referred to as the “bread basket of the world,” because of its 
role as the top agricultural exporter in the world, as 30 percent of U.S. produced crops are 
exported (Ag 101: Economic Overview 2013). U.S. farmers are, in fact, the most 
productive in the history of the world, and food is cheaper in the United States than in 
any other developed country in the world (Ag 101: Economic Overview 2013). This 
presents benefits both in terms of guaranteeing national food security, and in providing 
food aid for third-world and developing countries.  
Yet, the current mix of policies has high associated costs. While health is 
certainly one well-known and publicized cost, there are other more submerged costs. 
                                                
3 By bureaucracy I mean those federal agencies tasked with implementation of federal law.  
4 Policy benefits can include any type of non-monetary benefit a corporation or individual might receive 
from government. For example, the American sugar industry receives protection from the government, 
allowing sugar to be sold within the US at an average of 6 cents per pound average than the world price 
(Worstall 2017).  
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Cheap food often comes at the price of humane labor conditions, which affect everyone 
from day laborers in the fields, to factory workers, to fast-food industry employees. 
Americans also pay a price in environmental impact, as concentrated animal feeding 
operations (CAFOs) produce waste-lagoons, super-bugs, and run-off from pesticides and 
fertilizers contaminate our water sources (also known as eutrophication). Further, factory 
farming and profit-maximizing slaughtering pose problems with animal abuse and 
cruelty. Finally, there are questions of food access in low-income communities, both 
because of the increase in food-deserts and therefore the availability of fresh food, and 
because of increased poverty. In fact, for the first time in four decades, the majority of 
students in public schools throughout the south and west come from low-income families 
(A New Majority: Low Income Students in the South and Nation 2013). We must decide 
if, and how, these students receive nourishment subsidized by government, through 
programs like WIC or the National School Lunch Program.  
In sum, the existing food system is a result of a variety of policies that, together, 
constitute an agricultural policy regime. These policies include direct monetary 
incentives to produce some kinds of crops rather than others (subsidies); regulations 
regarding everything from labeling and advertising to pesticide use; energy policies 
designating the proportion of ethanol that gasoline should contain; labor laws dictating 
the age at which children may begin working in agriculture;5 and protections for various 
American industries such as sugar (see footnote four). Often the line separating food 
policy from other policy battles is a thin one; for instance, agriculture work and 
immigration policy are closely interrelated, as agricultural workers often acquire 
temporary visas to become day-laborers, then remain as undocumented workers as their 
                                                
5 Children as young as fourteen are allowed to work in fields, and the legal age for hazardous work in 
agriculture is set at sixteen (as opposed to eighteen in other industries).  
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visas expire. These workers have very limited legal protections, and are vulnerable to 
becoming essentially slaves in the agricultural industry. In short, our agricultural policy 
regime has broad and far-reaching consequences due to the interconnected nature of 
American public policy (particularly labor, health, and food policy).  
 
How did we wind up with our current agricultural policy regime? One explanation 
has to do with the ways in which the state, citizens, and groups interact with each other. 
There are a variety of players in the policy process, all of whom attempt to manipulate 
the content of law. Political scientists have long grappled, in particular, with the subject 
of interest group influence, asking the question: in the US, do interest groups have 
advantages in influencing government behavior or outputs? Further, if these groups are 
particularly advantaged, where does that advantage stem from? Literature on subsystems6 
has debated these questions vigorously, particularly focusing on how much access 
interest groups have to policymakers. Some scholars have found relatively closed or 
captured subsystems, indicating a high level of access and influence (Hansen 1991; 
Worsham 2006); while others have found open and fluid subsystems or even relatively 
autonomous government actors, indicating a lower level of access or influence (Browne 
1988; Finegold 1995; Gais, Peterson, and Walker 1984; A. D. Sheingate 2003).  
Looking at variations in interest group lobbying strategy can offer insight into this 
debate by helping scholars understand the differences between large and small interest 
groups, high-spending and low-spending lobbying interests, and different types of 
lobbying interest groups. Therefore, this dissertation asks: how do the variety of interest 
                                                
6 I define subsystems as informal decision-making arrangements or structures within government that often 
encompass extra-governmental entities such as lobbyists and industry.  
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groups representing agricultural, food, and commodity producers, lobby Congress and the 
bureaucracy7 in order to influence policy outputs? What are their lobbying strategies?  
Worth noting, though perhaps obvious, is that this dissertation assumes that 
lobbying does matter. The alternative assumption would be that groups irrationally 
continuing to pour money into an exercise that produces no results. Though it is possible 
that the interests that cumulatively spent over $3.5 billion dollars in 2009 on the practice 
were misinformed about the effectiveness of their endeavors, it seems unlikely (Influence 
& Lobbying 2014), particularly given the collective action barriers that these groups must 
overcome in order to engage in lobbying (Olson 1971). I offer an empirical means 
understand lobbying strategies, and the way that these strategies change in response to 
changes in the institutional and political environment.  
There are several notable tools which interest groups might use to directly 
influence policy: one is to insert favorable language directly in to law, either into the 
original language of a bill, or through amendment of a bill.8 A second possibility is 
through the expansion or application of bureaucratic power.9 This argument has been 
advanced by a longtime student of policymaking, “when agribusiness feels it necessary to 
lobby, its main concern is with the highly specific effects of administrative rulings or 
regulatory legislation” (Browne 1982), but has not yet been fully explored. Indeed, those 
interest groups that have close relationships with bureaucracies, or believe that they can 
                                                
7 Lobbying the bureaucracy can mean a variety of activities, from conducting ex parte meetings, to 
organizing a public comment campaign, to inviting bureaucrats to events orchestrated for their benefit.  
8 For instance, persuading legislators to raise the direct subsidy amount of sorghum. 
9 A current example is the USDA’s consideration of new rules, which would allow poultry processing 
plants to increase poultry slaughter assembly line speeds against the preferences of poultry line workers 
who fear disabling musculoskeletal injuries.  
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effectively lobby bureaucracies for favorable policies, may prefer that bureaucratic rule 
making power be expanded in relevant areas.10  
Interest groups might also employ former members of Congress, their aides, or 
alternatively, they may have close connections with former employees who are now 
bureaucrats. These kinds of substantive influence are far subtler, and often more difficult 
to measure, than vote changes – but they are fundamental to the production of American 
public policy. Revolving door influence, for instance, increases access that groups have 
to decision-makers, but does not necessarily alter the mechanisms mentioned above. 
Agricultural policy is a particularly good subsystem for studying interest group 
influence. It has a long policy history, beginning in the 1930s with the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, and has expanded in scope and importance since. Indeed, the 
agricultural subsystem has consequently been the subject of many subsystem studies in 
political science (see Browne 1988; Hansen 1991; A. D. Sheingate 2003, among others). 
By limiting the study to a single subsystem, this dissertation is able to closely examine 
the changing relationships between interest groups, Congress, and the bureaucracy.  
WHAT DO WE KNOW AND HOW DO WE STUDY LOBBYING: A BRIEF SUMMARY  
The study of lobbying begins with the assumption that groups want their 
preferences to be represented in the governing system. There are many ways that 
organized interests can achieve their desired outcomes: means such as public relations, 
litigation, illegal activities (acting on firm preferences in conflict with the law might 
occur when penalties are small but payoffs are large), making campaign or PAC 
                                                
10 Expanding regulations nearly always increases the cost of entry into an industry, and thus reduces 
competition. An example of this might be the Food Safety and Modernization Act, signed into law in 2011, 
which expanded FDA oversight of domestic and imported food products. Large producers were highly in 
favor of this and lobbied strongly in favor, while smaller producer groups opposed quite strongly. New 
FDA rules are likely to be far easier for large producers to comply with given the associated costs, thus 
pushing many smaller producers out of business and reducing competition.  
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contributions (potentially resulting in quid pro quo exchanges between interests and 
lawmakers), and lobbying directed at either Congress or the bureaucracy. However, not 
all these behaviors are equal in their potential payoffs. For example, litigation carries the 
risk that existing law might not be interpreted in a group’s interests. Free media can be 
unpredictable, and leaves an interest with very little control over the message. Illegal 
activity, such as running a slaughter line at a faster than legal speed, could lead to 
negative public opinion or legal consequences, creating unanticipated costs that exceed 
the payoffs. Further, each behavior has heavy costs (paying public relations firms, hiring 
lawyers, organizing politically, etc.), meaning that groups must calculate the relative 
trade-offs and benefits gained from each path. Presumably, having one’s preferences 
represented in law is the ultimate payoff for any interest, though this does not mean that 
all interest groups will expend the energy to gain this benefit. For this reason, if interests 
do choose to seek representation in the body of law, making campaign contributions on a 
quid pro quo basis or engaging in lobbying might be preferable.  
Research investigating the potential quid pro quo relationship between organized 
interests and politicians has often looked to campaign contributions to measure influence. 
However, the findings regarding quid pro quo tradeoffs between members of Congress 
and interest groups suggest that the exchange is far subtler than quid pro quo, and indeed, 
that campaign contributions do not necessarily lead to favorable legislative outputs (Hall 
and Wayman 1990; Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000; Welch 1982). While one study 
on the legislation of milk subsidies did find a direct connection between Congressional 
behavior and campaign contributions, it found that members of Congress were rewarded 
after a favorable vote rather than before one (Welch 1982). Notably, campaign 
contributions do motivate members to spend more time on an issue (Hall and Wayman 
1990). In short, the evidence suggests that interest groups cannot rely solely on campaign 
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contributions to gain favorable legislation, though certainly campaign contributions might 
be helpful.  
That interests are not buying votes does not mean that they are not swaying vote 
choices. One analysis shows committee level voting by a member of the U.S. 
Agricultural or Ways and Means Committees is best explained by the number of contacts 
that member received from groups on each side of an issue (Wright 1990). Other research 
has attempted to draw parallels between lobbying expenditures and political action 
committee (PAC) campaign contributions. They conclude that because lobbying 
expenditures mirror PAC campaign contribution expenditures, which have been found to 
have no effect, lobbying must not affect policy outcomes (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 
2000). Still others have found that PAC contributions, and thus lobbying, are influential 
in Congressional decision making (Langbein 1993).  However, extending findings from 
campaign finance in order to draw conclusions on lobbying is inappropriate, and many 
PAC studies fail to directly measure lobbying in any case (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). 
The conclusion that lobbying must not be effective because there is not a clear effect 
from campaign contributions counters intuition as well as evidence from other fields. 
Lobbying is distinctly different than campaign contributions in its nature and 
purpose; lobbying involves no direct transfer of capital between interests and members of 
Congress (J. M. de Figueiredo 2002). Lobbying can instead be defined relatively broadly 
as an attempt to persuade or encourage legislators (Denzau and Munger 1986; Hall and 
Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998).  
The importance of lobbying to corporate value is demonstrated in a variety of 
studies emerging from business schools and business journals. Several studies have found 
that corporations engage in lobbying government with so as to influence financial 
regulation and legislation, and to otherwise increase gains in the marketplace (Alexander, 
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Mazza, and Scholz 2009; Blau, Brough, and Thomas 2011; Hill et al. 2013; Hochberg, 
Sapienza, and Vissing-Jørgensen 2009; Mathur and Singh 2011; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 
2010; Richter 2011; Yu and Yu 2012). Firms engaged in lobbying experienced a return of 
over $220 for every $1 spent on lobbying according to Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz 
(2009). Yet, business literature on lobbying tends to over-simplify governmental 
processes and actors, and to ignore what political scientists consider to be key political 
variables such as public opinion (which constitutes a considerable omission when 
studying hot-button financial issues such as the Wall Street bailout in 2008). Further, 
some research has suggested that what corporate lobbyists are really getting out of 
lobbying is an assurance that politicians will be inactive – a guarantee of the status quo 
(Drutman 2015; McChesney 1997).  
One way to explain the discrepancy between the null findings regarding vote 
change in political science and the positive findings of influence in the business literature 
is due problematic methodological approaches within both literatures. Political science 
often relies on self-reporting through interviews and surveys in order to determine the 
effect of lobbying; it is no surprise that politicians might prefer to say that they are not 
swayed by lobbying and that they think only of their constituents when making decisions. 
McChesney’s rent extraction theory above, in which corporations pay for political 
inaction, also helps explain why political scientists so often experience “null” findings 
when it comes to vote change in response to lobbying. Still, measuring lobbying 
effectiveness presents additional problems.   
Relying on roll call vote change as a measure of lobbying effectiveness is a very 
blunt measure (and fails to account for the possibility of a preference for the status-quo). 
Perhaps lobbying serves a purpose other than swaying votes. “Most quantitative 
assessments of group influence tend to overlook a well-documented truth about 
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policymaking: most action takes place long before the floor vote… the focus on votes 
also makes it easy for scholars mistakenly to begin thinking about influence as a 
dichotomous, rather than continuous, variable…” according to Baumgartner and Leech 
(1998, 137–138). Indeed, vote change is a high bar at best, by which to measure lobby 
success, and a nearly impossible bar at worst. A lobbyist would need to persuade a 
legislator to potentially overlook his or her personal preferences, as well as potentially 
overlook the preferences of his or her constituency in order to change a “no” vote to a 
“yes.” Further, looking at votes alone disguises the “sausage making” process, and the 
sausage making of committee work is where essential policy details are negotiated 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  
The legislative subsidy literature indicates that lobbying begins long before the 
final vote tally is taken, and looking only at votes ignores the many possible points of 
influence throughout the legislative process. Indeed, influence may be exerted by 
providing legislative language, persuading bureaucracy to advocate for particular 
policies, or by litigating after legislation has passed. Another possible avenue of influence 
for interest groups is simply providing information to policymakers.  
By providing information (both policy and political), rather than buying votes, 
lobbyists are in the potentially powerful position of participating in the policy 
construction process, as they attempt to structure the range of policy proposals being 
considered.11 Lobbyists engage primarily in providing information to lawmakers, a 
behavior that occurs over time and well before voting occurs on the floor. Here 
information acquisition is costly to lawmakers either because of scarcity, or because 
information is plentiful and winnowing is highly time consuming. Information is not 
                                                
11 Whether or not lobbying should be considered a form of agenda setting is debatable, as it has been 
argued that lobbyists determine those issues on which they will lobby after the agenda has been set by 
members of Congress (Baumgartner and Leech 1998).   
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provided on a quid pro quo basis; rather, information is provided to assist lawmakers who 
are in relevant offices or who have similar policy positions to the interested groups. 
Existing “money and politics” literature offers significant reason to believe that lobbying 
does provide a substantial informational benefit to both legislators and interest groups. In 
fact, quite a bit of the existing literature in this field focuses on the potential of lobbying 
as a legislative subsidy (Austen-Smith 1993; Austen-Smith and Wright 1992; 
Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall and Deardorff 2006), and there is evidence that hearing 
testimony impacts political decision-making (Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992).  
Lobbying occurs primarily inside the world of Congress and the bureaucracy. 
And, while lobbying is a method for groups to achieve desirable outcomes, it also enables 
Congress to achieve its ends. Congress is organized into committees to specialize in 
information gathering and creating legislation. These committees must identify problems 
(define the problem space), and propose solutions. The committee system solves several 
problems for Congress: organizing and winnowing information, allowing credit claiming 
(necessary for reelection), allowing legislators to work on those issues they care most 
about, and providing particularized benefits. However, even within the committee 
system, legislators still individually face the problem of problems of gathering and 
winnowing information. Because attention is scarce (Simon 1985), subsystems allow 
committees to screen the information and actors to whom they devote attention; and 
lobbying is, in some sense, a service that groups provide to legislators in order to reduce 
information costs.   
Like the relationship between lobbyists and Congress, the relationship between 
bureaucracies and lobbyists is also mutually beneficial. Lobbying provides bureaucrats 
with political information and allows bureaucracies to respond to their constituencies 
(namely, the interests whom they work with and serve). And, as with Congress, lobbying 
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provides bureaucrats with policy information, thus reducing information costs. 
Bureaucracies often make policy beyond that which Congress directs them to do in real 
time; bureaucratic rules may be made in response to legislation passed a decade previous.  
In addition to reducing policy-relevant information costs for Congress and the 
bureaucracy, lobbying also plays an important role in the principal agent relationship 
between Congress and the bureaucracy. Interests are able to participate in fire-alarm 
oversight of bureaucracy, alerting Congressional committees to the need for oversight 
hearings or new controls on bureaucracy. Simultaneously, as interests lobby the 
bureaucracy for preferably policy outputs, they also keep bureaucracy informed of their 
preferences and positions, allowing bureaucracy to avoid potential oversight by 
responding to conflicts as they arise. Lobbying thus serves as a link between bureaucracy 
and Congress, creating a triangular relationship of sorts. 
Indeed, the subsystem idea originates with an iron-triangle literature, which 
depicts a nearly unbreakable and impermeable relationship between Congressional 
committees, interest groups, and the bureaucracy. Though political scientists no longer 
consider this relationship as necessarily being ironclad, they continue to envision the 
relationships between these actors as a sort of sub-government in which a significant 
proportion of decision-making occurs. In sum, subsystems can be thought of as informal 
decision-making institutions12 within government. Subsystems theory emphasizes the role 
of public and private organizations (i.e. interest groups); it suggests that the policy 
process has become decentralized and fragmented, allowing for informal alliances in the 
policy making process (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Gais, Peterson, and Walker 1984; 
Smith and Larimer 2009).  
                                                
12 “Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive 
and structured interactions” (Ostrom 2005, 3). In other words, institutions can be thought of as the rules and 
norms that humans use to structure interactions. 
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These subsystems allow Congress and the bureaucracy to pay special attention to 
those interests who are most concerned about an issue, and who will therefore provide the 
most policy and politics relevant information. Lobbying is one primary way that interests 
both inside and outside of a subsystem can transmit information both to Congress and to 
the bureaucracy. This subsystem literature explains the fluidity with which various 
groups enter and exit the policymaking process. Groups will want to participate only in 
those policy decisions on which they have some interest, and given the increasingly niche 
nature of the policy process, this may mean engaging with relatively few issues (Browne 
1990). In other words, interest groups are strategic.  
Viewing professional lobbyists as strategic actors who provide information, 
political intelligence, and legislative labor to deliberately chosen legislators suggests that 
lobbyists do not necessarily change legislators minds; rather, they look to assist 
legislators who are already aligned with their preferences (Austen-Smith 1995; Hall and 
Deardorff 2006). In short, lobbying is largely a strategic information transmission, 
intended to influence legislative decision-making by providing information that might 
otherwise be costly for legislators to acquire (Austen-Smith 1993; Austen-Smith and 
Wright 1992). And, as noted, lobbying also benefits legislators by bearing some of the 
costs that they would otherwise incur.  
Yet the subsystem literature often stops short of describing the internal 
negotiation involved in lobbying. By simplifying the triangular relationship between 
Congress, the bureaucracy, and interest groups, the literature often imagines the “interest 
group” as a monolith. This dissertation fills the lacuna by researching the tradeoffs that 
interest groups make, and how the political environment impacts those decisions. 
Specifically, the dissertation uses agricultural policy as the vehicle by which to study 
subsystems and interest group behavior.  
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For many reasons, agricultural policy is a particularly good study of subsystem 
influence. Political science has historically used agriculture as a representative case for 
these kinds of studies. In fact, it has been argued that, "agriculture, as one of the oldest 
organized sets of interests involved in influencing U.S. public policy… is arguably the 
best possible choice for such a study" (1988, 3). Additionally, agricultural and related 
industries are enormous players in the U.S. economy, contributing about $9.95 trillion to 
the nominal GDP in 2012, and employing over one-sixth of the U.S. civilian labor force 
(Ag 101: Economic Overview 2013, 101). By looking at lobbying in the agriculture 
sector alone, this dissertation examines the internal mechanisms of lobbying decisions 
while eliminating the noise potentially caused by minor variation between issue areas.  
THE PUZZLE AND THE ARGUMENT  
Interest groups should be expected to lobby Congress and the bureaucracy in the 
manner that they believe will achieve the most desirable outcomes (profit maximization 
for corporate interests; public goods for consumer interests, etc.) However, even among 
interests that might presumably have the same or similar goals, there are differing 
lobbying strategies. In short, there exists variation in the distribution of lobbying, by 
different interests at any given time, and by the same interests over time, between 
Congress and the bureaucracy. Therefore this research addresses the following question: 
what institutional and political factors determine a firm’s or interest’s strategic decision 
regarding whom to lobby?  
The very few previous studies of strategies of lobbying have generally looked 
across all issue areas to determine whether Congress of the Executive receives more 
lobbying attention, and under what conditions (Gause and Lorenz 2014; McKay 2011; 
McQuide 2010). These studies have found that conflict attracts a higher level of lobbying 
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toward both Congress and the bureaucracy (McKay 2011), and that the higher salience an 
issue is, the more likely groups are to lobby Congress specifically (Gause and Lorenz 
2014). Along these lines, Leech et al. show that groups often become involved in 
lobbying Washington because of pre-existing levels of government activity in issue areas 
that concern them (2005). Finally, interest groups are more likely to lobby in a venue 
when their opposition is lobbying in that venue (Holyoke 2003a).  
One contribution of this dissertation is to look more closely at a specific issue 
area, agriculture, and to determine the mechanisms by which interest groups make these 
lobbying decisions. This dissertation includes those variables that were found to be 
significant in previous studies, as well as adding several new variables for consideration. 
The empirical contribution of this dissertation is to explain the variation in strategies of 
lobbying with special attention to how political environment impacts these decisions.  
To better explain this variation this dissertation pays special attention to two 
variables of particular interest: interest group revenue and Congressional polarization. As 
previously noted, one of the lacunas in existing literature occurs at the intersection of 
political science and business literatures. Political scientists rarely try to use firm-level 
data when studying lobbying, in spite of the findings from business literature that indicate 
a considerable fiscal barrier to entry into political advocacy (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 
2011; Mathur and Singh 2011); while business literature on lobbying tends to over-
simplify governmental processes and actors. By considering both individual-level 
characteristics of lobbying firms and the political context in which interest groups are 
acting, this dissertation bridges the research gap between business and political science.  
In this dissertation I make and support three main claims. The first is that 
Congressional polarization is strengthening the influence of interest groups in 
Washington. The second is that financial barriers, combined with constituency-based 
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connections to members of Congress result in a stratified lobbying abilities among 
interest groups and necessitate different strategies by these groups. Those groups who 
have both financial resources, and can claim to speak for a relevant constituency, will 
generally find far more success in their lobbying efforts. And finally, the third claim is 
that lobbying is a self-reinforcing activity. Once an interest group begins to find success 
in their political advocacy they will continue to do so, while struggling groups are simply 
left behind in a Darwinian process that rewards the strongest with legislative success and 
often excludes the weakest from policy benefits all together.  
If my claims are accurate, I expect to see that polarization will drive an increase in 
interest group lobbying Congress and a corresponding decrease in lobbying the 
Bureaucracy, as interest groups flock to the venue in which they have greater impact. I 
expect this for all types of lobbying groups; but the caveat to this is that I also expect that 
firms who have higher revenue will do considerably more lobbying in all venues and see 
considerably more success from their efforts, both because they are able to do so and 
because they speak for a larger potential constituency, while firms with lower revenue 
will be more strategic in their behavior.  
RESEARCH DESIGN, IN BRIEF 
In order to test the above assertions, this dissertation uses a multi-method 
approach of both statistical analysis and interviews with lobbyists, legislative staffers, 
and reporters. The statistical chapters consider lobbying groups by type: interest groups, 
firms, local governments, and unions, while the interview chapter consults with a variety 
of lobbyists, legislative staffers, and journalists. 
The first statistical chapter considers corporate lobbying, while the final statistical 
chapter compares four categories of lobbying groups: interest groups, firms, local 
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governments, and unions. Both of these chapters rely on data from the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995. The original LDA of 1995 required lobbying reports from 
any organization spending or earning more than $10,000 in a six-month period on 
lobbying the federal government; the legislation has since been updated to cover 
organizations that spend more than $3000 on lobbying activities during a given quarter 
(Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance 2013). These reports are limited in their content, but 
provide a useful and quantifiable measure of the amount of lobbying activity occur in a 
given sector, year, and branch of government.  
The interview-based chapter explains the strategic reasoning behind firm and 
interest group lobbying strategies and gives special attention to the efficacy of various 
strategies under polarized political conditions. This chapter relies on a series of loosely 
structured interviews with a total of 18 Washington insiders, conducted over a two-year 
period. These individuals discussed everything from coalition building, to writing bill 
provisions, to delivering presentations in front of the Office of Management and Budget. 
These interviews provide insight into how lobbyists and legislative staffers view their 
jobs and what strategies they find most useful in their endeavors to influence public 
policy.  
Ultimately, using a multi-method, multi-level approach allows the dissertation to 
consider how revenue impacts lobbying strategy and influence, to consider how political 
polarization influences the policy process, and to make arguments as to the logic and 
efficacy of various lobbying strategies in our increasingly polarized environment.   
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION  
I begin by laying out the theoretical foundations for the research. Chapter 2 
provides an overview of the lobbying literature and demonstrates the theoretical and 
empirical place that this dissertation fits. In this chapter I detail the nature of the 
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Agricultural subsystem and explain how polarization is altering the political landscape in 
unprecedented ways and what we can expect from lobbying organizations as a result. 
Finally, this chapter argues that polarization is exaggerating the self-reinforcing nature of 
influence in Washington. 
Chapter 3 uses a statistical analysis of corporate lobbying in agriculture from 
1998 through 2013 as the first test of the theories advanced in this dissertation. Looking 
at firm behavior at the outset is advantageous because of the added information available 
regarding firms (revenue and headquarter location), as well as the homogeneity of 
corporate lobbying purpose. Corporations lobby with the single goal of profit 
maximization, rather than for altruistic or collective purposes (Alexander, Mazza, and 
Scholz 2009; Blau, Brough, and Thomas 2011; Hill et al. 2013; Hochberg, Sapienza, and 
Vissing-Jørgensen 2009; Mathur and Singh 2011; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2010; Richter 
2011; Yu and Yu 2012). This chapter includes political variables and shows the 
enormous impact polarization has on corporate lobbying behavior, particularly in 
increasing the amount of lobbying that small firms do in Congress.   
Chapter 4 also relies on statistical analysis of LDA data to show that firms are not 
the only organizations altering their lobbying behavior in response to political 
polarization. This chapter shows that polarization is increasing Congressional lobbying 
across the board, and driving down lobbying of bureaucratic agencies. Indeed, interest 
groups show an even stronger propensity for this pattern of venue change than corporate 
organizations.  
Chapter 5 uses author interviews with lobbyists, legislative staffers, and 
journalists to flesh out why polarization is driving an increase in lobbying in Congress 
and how it changes the role of lobbyists in the Agricultural subsystem. This chapter finds 
that polarization is creating an increased role for lobbyists in the process of negotiating 
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legislation. Lobbyists often do the heavy lifting of creating coalitional support for 
controversial legislation, making it possible for politicians to vote across the aisle in an 
environment that more and more frequently pushes legislators to cast party-line votes. 
The dissertation concludes with Chapter 6, which summarizes the findings 
presented here and synthesizes the practical implications of these findings for politics. 
This chapter also considers avenues for future research and suggests what developments 
political scientists might look for with regards to lobbying in Washington, as polarization 




Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory 
Firms, people, and organizations that lobby government (henceforth, referred to 
under the banner of “interests” or “interest groups”) do so because they hope to influence 
public policy, either in the form of public laws or regulations. These groups must be 
strategic in how they proceed in their lobbying behavior. Why? Because (for some) 
resources are finite; because, for all, political capital is finite; and because, above all, 
reputation is key (Hansen 1991; Milbrath 1963). Interest groups who seek to influence 
law must be smart, resourceful, and savvy in their attempts, while simultaneously being 
perceived as trustworthy by those who they hope to influence. To this end, I assume that 
groups will engage in those behaviors that they believe will yield the most favorable 
outcomes. 
The first question then is: what strategies do they employ?  What lobbying 
strategies do groups believe to be most effective and under what conditions? The second 
question is: do the activities that groups engage in align with our current understandings 
and assumptions about the political world?  
In this dissertation I present three main findings. The first is that unprecedented 
polarization in Congress is creating new possibilities for interest group influence through 
lobbying. I show that as Congress experiences increased gridlock and a reduced capacity 
for compromise and negotiation, interest groups increase their lobbying efforts – seeing 
this as an opportunity to peddle their preferred policy solutions and negotiate between 
parties that are (figuratively) at war. 
Second, I show that financial resources (“deep pockets”) are necessary, but not 
sufficient, for effective corporate lobbying. I find that financial resources in combination 
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with constituency-based relationships with members of Congress a leading factor in 
lobbying strategy (and success) for most firms who choose to lobby.  
Finally, for both firms and interest groups, at large, I show that lobbying is a 
highly self-reinforcing activity. Once groups become involved in political advocacy, they 
develop the skills necessary to succeed. As a group begins to see success from their 
lobbying efforts, they find new and continued reasons to participate in politics.  
This chapter lays out the theoretical reasoning behind those expectations and 
situates this study and its contributions in the broader political science literature. Section 
one of this chapter details the nature of political subsystems and the environment that has 
historically been thought to affect lobbying behavior. Section two hones in on the specific 
capacity of organizations to lobby, and how that capacity translates to lobbying 
effectiveness. The third section elaborates on the self-reinforcing nature of institutions, 
and illustrate why we should expect similarly self-reinforcing behavior from interest 
groups as well.  
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, SUBSYSTEMS, AND INTEREST GROUPS  
Subsystems are the informal micro-institutions in which lobbying occurs.13 They 
consist of committees, interest groups, and bureaucracies who, together, make policy-
relevant decisions. These subsystems (once known as iron triangles) form and reform as 
policy ideas come and go, attracting different players and interests with each new policy 
idea. While the core elements may remain, the coalitions and players can shift.  
One key question that political scientists have discussed is how open subsystems 
are to new “players.” In other words, when new policy ideas come on to the agenda, are 
new participants able to enter the subsystem and influence the decision-making process? 
                                                
13 The mezzo-institution might be agencies, the branches of government, and so forth, while macro-
institutions might include the government as a whole, the constitution, and so on.  
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Some scholars have found relatively closed or captured subsystems, indicating a 
high level of access and influence for a few interest groups, and low access for others 
(Hansen 1991; Worsham 2006). Others have found open and fluid subsystems or even 
relatively autonomous government actors, indicating a lower level of access or influence 
for any one interest group, but allowing many to impact the policy process in smaller 
ways (Browne 1988; Finegold 1995; Gais, Peterson, and Walker 1984; Sheingate 2003). 
Many of these scholars have used agriculture policy as a case study in their research, but 
there is no consensus on which kind of subsystem agricultural policy falls in to.  
Whether open or closed, the agricultural subsystem has historically been a 
remarkably bipartisan policy area. However, the subsystem is now in a moment of flux, 
and legislation (particularly the farm bill) is becoming highly contentious (Sheingate 
2013). In 2008, for example, Congress easily overrode a presidential veto on the Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act, with a final tally of 316-to-108 in the House, and 80-14 in 
the Senate. But just six short years later, in 2013 (one year after the expiration of the 
2008 farm bill), the farm bill failed in the House of Representatives. What should have 
been the 2013 farm bill, titled the Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act 
of 2013, was not signed in to law until January 2014. 
Why did the farm bill struggle so badly in the House of Representatives in 2013? 
The answer lies in increasing polarization, and particularly in the increasing extremism of 
Republicans. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) wanted stricter cuts to food 
stamps and a toughening of work requirements for those receiving benefits. Frank Lucas 
(R-OK), then chairman of the Agriculture Committee balked, knowing that such a move 
would undercut support from Democrats, both in the committee and on the floor. In 
response, Cantor pushed an amendment by Steve Southerland (R-FL) that would have 
achieved these ends and resulted in severe cuts to hunger and nutrition programs (Rogers 
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2013). When the farm bill came to the floor, Republicans largely voted for the 
amendment, which (as predicted) undercut Democratic support for the bill. Ultimately, 62 
conservative Republicans still ended up voting against the farm bill, saying that it did not 
cut spending enough; while most Democrats also voted against. Eventually the Senate 
version of the bill became law, though neither side was pleased with the content. The 
final version of the bill included $8 billion in cuts to hunger and nutrition programs (such 
as the supplemental nutrition assistance program), which was a far cry from the $40 
billion cut that some Republicans had called for. And, while lawmakers claimed that it 
was a bipartisan effort, not a single Republican lawmaker attended the signing of the law, 
though many were invited (Good 2014).  
This struggle illustrates the possible dissolution of a coalition between 
conservative farm policy advocates and liberal hunger policy advocates who had 
consistently worked together on agricultural legislation. If the agricultural subsystem was 
not open before, it certainly is becoming so now. The current agriculture subsystem is 
showing telltale signs of being in a moment of instability (as in Agendas and Instability 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993). While it is difficult to tell if the subsystem is on the brink 
of collapse and reformation, we can tell that partisanship is moving and shaking the 
internal relationships within Congress (Gray et al. 2015; Sinclair 2006a; Theriault 2013) 
and that extends to agricultural interests therein.  
The clear partisan breakdown of a historically bipartisan arena opens the 
possibility to observing how lobbyists and interest groups behave as the political ground 
under them shifts. What happens when coalitions break down, partisanship increases, and 
negotiations fall apart? Does increasing partisanship affect the lobbying strategy that 
interest groups use? Should we expect that it would? 
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The literature suggests: maybe. Baumgartner and Jones argue that controversy 
increases the likelihood that decision-making authority may shift between venues (1993, 
34). Increasing polarization, as an instigator of conflict, is therefore a potential catalyst 
for forcing interest groups to change their lobbying strategies. If the subsystem does not 
fall apart, sending groups to the courts or to local venues (which does not appear to 
happen), then it may be appropriate to look for venue changes within the subsystem. 
Within the subsystem, interest groups have several options for lobbying. Within 
Congress, groups can move between committees depending on how any given committee 
is likely to view a particular issue. But they can also move between institutions since each 
institution may have a different understanding of the issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 
31). Venues may be more or less sympathetic to the perspective of an interest group or 
set of interests (Holyoke 2003b). Lobbying groups may approach Congress, the 
Bureaucracy, and, or, the White House. And certainly, at any time, interest groups can, 
and do, work with any of these formal institutions in order to achieve their preferences. 
Switching between these venues one possible way to venue shop without abandoning the 
enterprise all together.  
Bureaucracy literature suggests that when the two chambers of the legislature are 
of the same party, but the executive branch is controlled by the opposite party, legislators 
are more likely to use statutory controls over the bureaucracy (Epstein and O’Halloran 
1995; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001). In other words, they will write more detailed 
legislation, giving the bureaucracy less discretion over the implementation process. The 
opposite is true when legislators have less capacity (Epstein and O’Halloran 1995; Huber, 
Shipan, and Pfahler 2001). When the legislature is divided, the bureaucracy will have 
more discretion for implementation because the legislature may be unable to agree on 
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more detailed legislation. They effectively “pass the buck,” as it were, to the 
implementing agency.  
While the bureaucracy literature specifically discusses delegation in the context of 
a divided legislature versus a unified government. However, the logic of delegating more 
when the legislature struggles to compromise ought to extend to those times when 
government may be unified, but polarization is high. During times of high polarization 
Congress ought to cede more implementation authority to bureaucracies because it will, 
similarly, have more difficulty agreeing on detailed legislation. Yet, such logic does not 
jive terribly well with literature on Congress, or on policymaking and agenda setting, for 
that matter.  
Polarization theoretically creates an environment in which we should expect 
behavior change; yet, we have only weak theories for how polarization should change 
lobbying behavior. An alternative logic suggests that interest groups lobby in venues 
where the agenda is actively being set (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Interest groups 
lobby in Congress when relevant legislation is being considered, and in the bureaucracy 
during the rulemaking process (subsequent to the legislative process). Polarization in 
Congress leads to increased competition for agenda setting (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993); and cyclically, increases in competition lead to more attention on the issue, and 
therefore more interest group involvement (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Baumgartner 
and Leech 2001; Schattschneider 1957). Interest groups “bandwagon” as attention 
increases, and flock to whichever venue other interest groups are lobbying in 
(Baumgartner and Leech 2001).  
The literature therefore suggests that polarization, because it is a form of conflict, 
will drive increased attention and bandwagoning. However, I argue that polarization is 
driving lobbying separate and distinctly as well. Polarization is not only a widening of the 
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conflict space. It also, as illustrated above, results in the dissolution of long-standing 
coalitions and the destruction of previously strong (by all appearances) policy 
architectures. Polarization is whittling away the long-standing relationships such as the 
historical alliance between hunger advocates and farm advocates, resulting in high 
uncertainty around the farm bill (Sheingate 2013).  
This uncertainty, I argue, creates two parallel incentives for interest groups to 
increase their lobbying efforts in Congress. The first is an incentive to gather information 
as traditional alliances and policy ideas break down. Interest groups (perhaps obviously) 
have a desire to reduce their own uncertainty and to stay abreast with current political 
negotiations. The second, more important, incentive for interest groups to increase their 
lobbying in Congress is that as polarization shifts the ground, there is new opportunity to 
suggest alternative policy ideas. As Congressional capacity for compromise decreases, 
interest groups have the opportunity to step in as “go-betweens” for offices and negotiate 
new policy details in their favor. Polarization, I argue, is creating increased opportunity 
for interest groups to achieve their policy preferences.  
Hypothesis: Polarization will increase lobbying efforts in Congress.  
While polarization does not occur in the bureaucracy or executive branch in 
exactly the same way that it does in Congress, evidence suggests that lobbying behavior 
spills over from Congress in to other branches. At the individual interest group level, 
increased lobbying in Congress is associated with increased lobbying in the bureaucracy 
and executive (Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty 2013). If an interest group lobbies a lot (in 
comparison to other groups), they are likely to do so across all institutions. This effect 
suggests that venue shopping is less likely to be a tradeoff of “either here or there” than it 
is to be a trade off of how much here and how much there. As polarization drives interest 
group lobbying to Congress, it may mean that groups who traditionally engage in high 
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levels of lobbying across all institutions will be forced to scale back on their lobbying in 
the bureaucracy or Congress, though not cease it altogether. This depends, in part, on the 
capacity of, and resources available to, the interest group.   
POLITICAL CAPACITY, LOBBYING EFFECTIVENESS  
Much of lobbying literature has focused on the informational benefits that 
lobbying provides to policymakers at all levels of government from legislators to 
bureaucrats to local governments (lobbying as a legislative subsidy) (Austen-Smith 1993; 
Austen-Smith and Wright 1992; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall and Deardorff 2006; 
Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992). The benefits to the party engaged in lobbying are, of 
course, policy in some form.  
Interest groups and trade associations are structured with the sole purpose of 
political advocacy, so for those groups there is no need to ask, “why engage at all?” since 
that is their stated mission.  
One question is why corporations engage in political activity beyond what they 
could achieve through their trade associations and other memberships. If a firm has the 
option of allowing its interest groups do the work of political advocacy, why would they 
take on the burden individually as well? Coca Cola, for instance, is a member of the 
American Beverage Association, yet also regularly engages in lobbying independent of 
the association as well. Why? Simply put, because Coca Cola has the financial resources 
to do so – they have the ability to engage in more specific advocacy, tailored to their own 
corporate needs and preferences. Resources are generally thought to be an antecedent to 
political activity (Laffont and Tirole 1991; Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Mathura and 
Singh 2011); and corporations that have the financial resources to engage in lobbying 
activity outside of their associations often do so (Hillman and Hitt 1999).  
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One reason that financial resources constitute a considerable barrier to entry is 
that for any interest group (whether corporate or nonprofit), lobbying is not a one-time, 
fixed expenditure. Lobbying incurs both short term and long-term costs. Interest groups 
compete with other groups, and in some cases even with political parties, to provide 
information to Congress (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall and Miler 2008; Hansen 1991). 
In order to remain a favored source of information a group must be a reliable source of 
political and policy information over time (Hansen 1991).14 Groups must therefore 
commit to making a long-term investment in providing lawmakers with useful 
information if they want to achieve high levels of access and influence over politics.  
The resource commitment that groups must make in order to gain leverage in the 
political system may result in a drop-off of the number of groups lobbying over time, as 
the costs associated with political advocacy add up. While groups do seem to have elastic 
budgets for political activity, these are often not unlimited budgets, and many groups 
have multiple policy concerns competing for resources and attention. Each time a group 
pursues a policy further through the process, it increases the resources spent on that 
policy. For instance, a group may be advocating both for increased wetlands conservation 
and for improved access to public lands for duck hunters. If one policy objective is not 
making headway, the group may abandon it in favor of devoting resources toward the 
other. Further, if achieving policy outcomes in Congress requires an increasing level of 
resource allocation and attention, groups may begin to scale back their political spending 
at later points in the policymaking process. If polarization increases the amount of 
lobbying a group does at the Congressional level, a group may have fewer resources to 
pursue the matter on the bureaucracy or executive levels of government.  
                                                
14 In interviews many lobbyists, both in-house and contract, repeatedly emphasized that reputation is 
currency in the lobbying industry.  
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Lobbying is not, of course, a perfectly sequential activity. A group may, at any 
point during the policy process, decide that lobbying a particular issue is becoming too 
costly (financially or in terms of political capital), and drop out. Because the primary 
activities of agencies begin after Congressional activity (during the rulemaking stage), it 
is reasonable to deduce that less wealthy interest groups may begin to drop out at this 
stage or at least scale back their efforts, particularly if they have made reasonable gains at 
the legislative level, while wealthier groups persist to pursue the exact policy details they 
prefer.  
The financial costs associated with length of involvement in the political arena are 
not the only costs of lobbying, particularly in the bureaucracy. One common strategy 
groups exercise when looking for regulatory change from bureaucracies is to ask 
legislators to intercede on their behalf (Holburn and Bergh 2008). Lobbyists also make 
heavy use of ex-parte meetings with bureaucrats (Watzman 2013b).15 Ex-parte meetings 
in particular rely on utilizing existing relationships to incentivize bureaucrats to grant 
these meetings, as they are informal meetings between bureaucrats and interest groups 
that occur outside of the rulemaking process. Groups who pursue lobbying at the 
bureaucratic level therefore often “spend” political capital asking for meetings, an 
activity that requires possessing political capital in the first place. If groups gain political 
capital (i.e. access and influence) through long-term involvement in the process and 
strong, long-standing relationships with policymakers, then resources are essential to 
success when lobbying agencies in particular.  
                                                
15 Several agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission voluntarily publish some 
information on ex parte meetings online. However, there is no uniform requirement that information about 
ex parte meetings between regulators and private interests be made available to the public (Watzman 
2013a). 
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The above strategies for regulatory change presume a legislature that is friendly to 
the changes that the lobbying group wants to achieve. If, for instance, a bureaucracy is 
sympathetic to the desires of the interest group, but the legislature is hostile and the 
bureaucracy is constrained by that hostility, the bureaucracy may simply send the interest 
group back to Congress, wherein the lobbying process begins anew (Holburn and Bergh 
2008). The lobbying process can quickly become arduous and extremely costly if the 
stars are not aligned just so. Because of the expense associated with continuing to pursue 
policy, we should expect that there would be considerable drop-off the further in the 
legislative process a policy gets.  
Hypothesis: As polarization incentivizes lobbying Congress, lobbying of the bureaucracy 
and White House will decrease.  
Hypothesis: Groups with fewer financial resources will do less lobbying in the 
bureaucracy and White House; relying more heavily on constituency-based relationships 
in Congress and dropping out of the process earlier.  
Financial resources are not the only type of resource necessary for a group to 
maximize its lobbying efforts. As noted above, political capital accumulated through 
long-term relationships is also useful. Access to and influence over lawmakers is also a 
matter of providing useful information to lawmakers over time (Drutman 2015; Hansen 
1991). Specifically, interest groups provide policy information, political intelligence, and 
legislative labor to deliberately chosen legislators (Austen-Smith 1995; Hall and 
Deardorff 2006). Policy information is a matter of expertise, and any group can cultivate 
information expertise should it wish to. However, providing political intelligence is more 
difficult. In order to provide “political intelligence,” a group must have some intelligence 
that is of use to legislators; and the kind of political intelligence that is the most useful to 
legislators is that related to their reelection prospects (Mayhew 1974). Lobbying is more 
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useful to a legislator when the lobbying group can provide some information on the 
legislator’s home district, constituency, and political chances therein.   
Because reelection information is highly prized, lobbying is more effective when 
an interest group or firm is based in the district of a relevant committee member (de 
Figueiredo and Silverman 2006). This means that if, for instance, the House Agricultural 
Committee is largely composed of members from Texas, Nebraska, and California, then 
organized interests with large constituencies in those states will have an advantage in 
lobbying at the committee level.16 For those interest groups who lack a direct 
constituency connection to important committee members, their task will be considerably 
complicated (Milbrath 1963). Bureaucracies, likewise, have constituencies (often the 
interests themselves), and these constituencies influence the preferences of the 
bureaucracy and help mediate the relationship between the bureaucracy and Congress 
(Banks and Weingast 1992).  
Constituency relationships should therefore do two things for lobbying interest 
groups. They should increase the relative likelihood that an interest group will make the 
initial decision to lobby; and they should facilitate the subsequent lobbying activity, 
making it easier and potentially increasing a group’s motivation to pursue political 
solutions to problems. Constituency relationships are the WD40 of political advocacy.  
Hypothesis: Constituency-based relationships with members of Congress will increase 
the amount of lobbying in that venue, and improve the effectiveness of the efforts.   
There are therefore two types of resources that impact a group’s capacity for 
political activity: fiscal resources and human-capital resources, the latter of which 
                                                
16 In this research I use ‘state’ rather than district as a proxy for constituency-based relationships to 
members of Congress because interest groups and corporations do not follow district lines (which are 
increasingly bizarre because of gerrymandering) – groups likely employ people or have members from 
multiple districts in a state.  
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contributes particularly to political capital. I expect that these two kinds of resources will 
boost each other. A group will enjoy the most access and influence if it possesses both 
the financial resources to engage in a potentially-multi-year effort and the constituency-
based relationships that enable them to provide politically necessary information to 
legislators.  
Hypothesis: Interest groups will be more efficient at lobbying, if they possess relatively 
more financial resources and consistency-based relationships with members of Congress.  
POLITICAL TIME, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTEREST GROUPS  
Interest group political activity has a final element – the element of “stickiness.” 
Lobbying, like many other political activities, is self-reinforcing, in terms of 
involvement, strategy, and effectiveness. Political arrangements often become deeply 
embedded over time because of “development,” rather than “choice;” these arrangements 
often stem from the “accumulation of self-reinforcing processes, … [and] the temporal 
order of events or processes,” which can be crucial determinants (Pierson 2004, 16). 
Informal political arrangements like subsystems and the relationships therein, no less than 
formal arrangements, are the product of self-reinforcing processes and events. As groups 
participate in political activity they establish relationships, routines, and norms in 
conjunction with the other political actors involved in the policy arena; this is the very 
definition and nature of subsystems (Hansen 1991;  Sheingate 2003). The political 
process is fundamentally based on repeated interactions between members of Congress, 
bureaucracies, and interest groups.  
For interest groups and corporations who engage in lobbying, the activity is self-
reinforcing; as they develop the capacity to lobby, they are more likely to engage in the 
activity at a higher level. Drutman (2015, 2) argues that, “corporate lobbying has reached 
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its modern pervasive position largely because corporate lobbying has its own internal 
momentum. In a word, lobbying is “sticky.” Hiring lobbyists and creating a government 
affairs department sets in motion a series of processes that, over time, collectively push 
companies toward more lobbying.” There is every reason to believe that this logic 
extends beyond corporations and applies to interest groups as well.  
Because successful lobbying is built on long-term relationships (Drutman 2015; 
Hansen 1991; Milbrath 1963), lobbying self-perpetuates no matter the type of group 
engaged in the activity. A majority of interest groups may be set-up for the sole purpose 
of political advocacy, but building relationships is an activity that is time consuming and 
long-term. A group cannot set up on the Potomac and effectively establish its reputation 
with members of Congress over the course of a few weeks. Building a reputation as a 
reliable provider of policy and political information takes time and effort. As groups 
build the capacity for lobbying and develop the necessary relationships, they begin to find 
more reasons to do so, and over time this leads to additional investment in lobbying 
capacity, which leads to more aggressive and comprehensive lobbying, and so on 
(Drutman 2015). This means that groups already set-up for advocacy may begin to extend 
their reach and lobby on more policy issues than were encompassed in their initially 
stated goal. It also means that the groups who will be most effective at achieving their 
policy preferences are the groups who lobby again and again, year after year (Hansen 
1991).  
I argue that there is also an increasing role for established, trusted interest groups 
as relationships within Congress break down. Polarization has increased steadily over 
time (Poole and Rosenthal 2007; Sinclair 2006b; Theriault 2013), as has lobbying (Leech 
et al. 2005). Many have argued that as government grows, so does the role for special 
interests (Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Benz et al. 2011; Leech et al. 2005). But 
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government is not only creating demand for interest groups as it produces more 
regulation and increases the reach of government. Polarized government also creates a 
space for trusted lobbyists to flourish because polarization creates an increase demand for 
the very brokering and negotiating skills that lobbyists possess. Partisanship has made 
committee work increasingly challenging for members, and has diminished their ability 
to come up with well-crafted policy solutions (Mann and Ornstein 2008). Lobbyists are 
able to grease the wheels and do the kind of trading and brokering that members of 
Congress seem to struggle with in the current environment. Lobbyists do not only provide 
informational subsidies, increasingly they provide ready-made policy solutions and 
perform the work of convincing policy-makers to support legislation (Andres 2009; 
Franklin 2014). In other words, lobbyists are beginning to do the work of committees, 
and they are allowed to do this work because they have established strong and lasting 
relationships with members and their staffs (Franklin 2014).  
Hypothesis: Polarization not only increases the amount of lobbying in Congress, but also 
increases the importance and influence of interest groups in the legislative process.  
WHY DO WE CARE?  
 Why should we care which groups are the most likely to lobby and where? 
Because we are in a pluralist system – it’s essential to understand what kinds of groups 
are most likely to be successful in their lobbying efforts because these lobbying efforts 
skew our policy outcomes. Which groups are most successful at lobbying in Congress 
impacts which foods are cheapest at the register, and which foods become staples in the 
American diet. Lobbying efforts impact the nutrition guidelines issued by the USDA 
(Heid 2016); and they even impact the presidential race (Boudreau 2016). In order to 
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identify which policy outcomes are most likely, we have to understand the vulnerabilities 
in the system and which groups are advantaged where and why.  
The steady increase of lobbying in response to polarization and the decline of the 
committee system also suggests that interest groups may be doing the work of Congress, 
rather than simply providing informational subsidies. This is remarkable because it 
indicates that interest groups are playing a more significant role in governance than we 
had previously thought. Interest groups are not only facilitating the process of 
information winnowing, they are now in the business of writing legislation and brokering 
its passage. This has powerful implications for who government is serving, and it 
presents significant challenges to the future of political science research. Sunlight laws 
are written with the purpose of exposing the inner-workings of Congress and providing 
more transparency to the legislative process. But if a significant portion of legislative 
work is being done outside of the Congressional halls, in offices, and on K-Street, then 
the laws intended to provide legislative transparency do us little good. The following 
chapters will illustrate where in government lobbying is occurring and what political 
factors drive it. I will show that money and connections, together, facilitate lobbying 
success, and that polarization drives interest group activity in a powerful way. 
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Chapter 3: The Business (as usual) of Washington: Political and 
Institutional Influences on Corporate Lobbying Strategy 
Agricultural policy is one of the longest standing subsystems in American 
Politics. The first Agricultural Adjustment Act, passed in 1933, laid the foundation for a 
complex set of agricultural, conservation, and nutrition programs, many of which are still 
in existence today in some form. This web of policies, the subsidies, allocations, and 
regulations create a fertile environment for interest group activity.  
Interest group activity in the agricultural sector, as in most others, is startlingly 
diverse. Any given group may utilize different lobbying strategies over time; and at any 
given point in time, a variety of groups are all using different lobbying strategies from 
one another. How do we explain this variation?   
Within political science exists a vibrant conversation on interest groups, lobbying, 
and subsystems. However, political science has devoted relatively little attention to how 
the individual characteristics of interest groups impact their lobbying capacity and 
strategy. I test which characteristics of organizations and aspects of the current 
institutional environment impact lobbying decisions in the agricultural sector. I first 
consider why some firms choose to lobby when so many (the majority, even) do not. I 
then consider the degree to which firms lobby either the bureaucracy or Congress (this is 
what I mean by “strategy”), and how their attention shifts in response to changes in the 
political environment such as polarization. I also test how the characteristics of firms 
themselves constrain or enable lobbying efforts. By doing this, I provide a more nuanced 
perspective on lobbying efforts within the agricultural sector, and illustrate the need for a 
more aggressive economy-wide analysis in the future. 
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I focus on firms in particular because they are distinct in their motivations from 
other types of lobbying group. The legislative goals of nonprofits, producer associations, 
and local government may vary widely. However the ultimate goal of a corporation is 
profit maximization, rather than altruistic or collective (Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz 
2009; Blau, Brough, and Thomas 2011; Hill et al. 2013; Hochberg, Sapienza, and 
Vissing-Jørgensen 2009; Mathur and Singh 2011; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2010; Richter 
2011; Yu and Yu 2012). By looking at firms, whose ultimate goal is profit maximization, 
the aim of this paper is to explain why groups who arguably have the same end-goals 
approach lobbying differently from one another. Given this, I ask: why do firms, who 
(presumably) all have the same objective of profit maximization, utilize different 
lobbying strategies from one another, and over time?  
One possible explanation for why some firms chose to lobby, and why those firms 
that do lobby utilize distinct strategies from one another, is their set of individual traits. 
The relative availability of resources, for instance, is a reasonable base explanation for 
why some firms lobby and others do not. Once the decision to lobby has been made, 
additional firm characteristics may dictate strategy; perhaps firms with ties to a member 
of Congress in a relevant committee find their Congressional lobbying to be more 
effective than efforts aimed at the executive branch. Firms with a higher monetary value 
but without representational ties may lobby Congress and the Bureaucracy more evenly, 
or may even find it necessary to expend more effort lobbying Congress.  
Organizational characteristics cannot, however, explain why a given firm often 
exercises different strategies over time. This may be better explained by looking at 
political and institutional features. One simple explanation might be that firms lobby 
Congress more actively during periods when Congress is considering more substantively 
important or a larger volume of legislation; and these firms might similarly lobby 
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bureaucracy more vociferously when a particular office is reviewing more important or a 
larger number of rules. Literature also suggests that interest groups may adjust their 
behavior in response to Congress division (Epstein and O’Halloran 1995; Huber and 
Shipan 2002; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001; Moe 1984). This research explores these 
possible explanations of variation in lobbying strategy, both across firms and over time.  
I begin with a discussion of where corporate lobbying fits in to the literature and 
what it adds to our understanding of policy construction. I lay out the puzzle in more 
detail, and explain the hypotheses and research rationale. I then present the research and 
discuss my findings.  
LOBBYING STRATEGY: WHAT THEY DO, AND WHEN THEY DO IT   
The background for research on lobbying begins with “The Logic of Collective 
Action,” by Mancur Olson (1971). The book argues that individuals have an incentive to 
free ride on the efforts others, particularly if the collective goal is to achieve public goods 
that are non-excludable. As Olson notes, firms, ultimately, have less trouble with 
collective action problems than other kinds of groups. This is evident from lobbying 
disclosure reports: the majority of lobbying in the United States is done by corporations 
and trade associations, rather than ideological and membership-based groups (Boehmke, 
Gailmard, and Patty 2013; J. M. de Figueiredo 2004). 
When firms lobby, they do so with the intention of profit maximization. Several 
studies have found that corporations engage in lobbying government, with great effect, to 
influence financial regulation and legislation and to otherwise increase gains in the 
marketplace (Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz 2009; Blau, Brough, and Thomas 2011; Hill 
et al. 2013; Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jørgensen 2009; Mathur and Singh 2011; 
Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2010; Richter 2011; Yu and Yu 2012). Additionally, Alexander, 
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Mazza, and Scholz (2009) find that firms engaged in lobbying experience a return of over 
$220 for every $1 spent on lobbying.  
Yet, in spite of the finding that firms who lobby experience an increase in profits, 
many firms do not lobby. These firms appear to rely on trade associations to accomplish 
the bulk of their political advocacy (this is evident both through the relatively large 
number of firms are inactive in lobbying, and the proliferation of highly active trade 
associations who work on their behalf). Only a limited set of firms, generally those with 
higher revenue, choose to go beyond what can be accomplished through trade 
associations (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Mathur and Singh 2011). Once a firm does 
decide to become involved in politics by lobbying, it must make strategic decisions 
regarding how to best expend resources and achieve desired ends.  
Holyoke (2003b) argues that groups will want to lobby in more sympathetic 
venues (legislature, courts, or executive branch), and will engage in pro-forma lobbying 
in venues where the cards are stacked against them.17 Within Congress, lobbyists 
generally target issue relevant committees, rather than initiating broad, institution-wide 
efforts (J. M. de Figueiredo and Richter 2013; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). In 
other words, lobbying groups will try to maximize their utility through venue shopping 
and targeting.  
Following from the conventional wisdom that suggests that groups lobby with the 
intention to influence committees (J. M. de Figueiredo and Richter 2013; Hojnacki and 
Kimball 1998, 1999), evidence suggests that when groups enjoy strong constituent ties to 
                                                
17 Lobbying directed toward Congress and the bureaucracy are generally highly correlated (Boehmke, 
Gailmard, and Patty 2013), meaning that the extent to which venue shopping is visible is most obvious as 
the relative amount of lobbying directed at each branch of government, and it is this that differs over time. 
It is important to note that groups may, of course, also lobby agencies independently of Congress, as 
agencies address regulatory issues over extended time periods, often years after Congress has finalized a 
particular piece of legislation. 
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a legislator’s district, they will pursue a combined grassroots and direct lobbying 
campaign, regardless of legislator position (Hojnacki and Kimball 1999).  
Political conditions on the Hill also impact lobbying strategies for those groups 
who are attuned. Agenda space and conflict are two of the most fundamental elements of 
the political environment, and yet, they change continuously, demanding that lobbying 
organizations adjust accordingly (and frequently). The broader the conflict, and the more 
government attention that is paid to any particular issue, the more organizations will 
actively lobby (Leech et al. 2005; Schattschneider 1957).  
Literature consensus therefore suggests that firm wealth (Mathur and Singh 
2011), perceived venue “friendliness” (Holyoke 2003b), constituent ties to members of 
Congress (Hojnacki and Kimball 1998), and the relative attention to an issue on the Hill 
(Leech et al. 2005), are the elements that together combine to impact interest group 
strategies. This leaves the question: what makes a venue sympathetic to a lobbying firm?  
Why and when does a firm lobby Congress, the bureaucracy, or the executive?  
LOBBYING STRATEGY: ADVANCING THE THEORY 
Literature on venue shopping between Congress, the bureaucracy, and the 
executive, has thus far focused on interest groups writ large. However, firms who engage 
in political behavior are, themselves, worthy of study independent from their lobbying 
counterparts of the nonprofit and advocacy persuasion. Business interests comprise the 
majority of lobbying groups, and they are distinctly profit-driven in their efforts 
(Drutman 2015). I expand on the current literature regarding firm lobbying strategies, and 
specifically lay out those general conditions under which firms find it advantageous to 
lobby one governmental institution over another.  
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While firm wealth is a significant hurdle to entry when it comes to political 
activity (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Mathur and Singh 2011), there is no reason to 
predict that it alone will determine in which venues firms enjoy the most lobbying 
success. Political Action Committee contributions, for instance, appear to have minimal 
impact on policy outcomes (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000). However, I argue that 
firm wealth (measured here as revenue), when combined with constituency-based 
relationships to members of Congress, make firms more successful in their lobbying 
efforts.  
These constituency-based relationships are not as “natural” to firms as they are to 
other kinds of interest groups. While interest groups are often composed of “grassroots 
memberships” that tie them to legislator constituency groups (Hojnacki and Kimball 
1999), firms must cultivate a grassroots constituency from their employees, stock holders, 
retirees, and the communities in which their offices are located (Baysinger 1984). When 
firms are successful in doing this and have the resources necessary to translate these 
constituency-based relationships into lobbying on the Hill, I predict that they will find 
their lobbying efforts in Congress to be more successful, thus reducing the need for 
lobbying in other venues (the bureaucracy and Congress).  
Hypothesis 1: Constituency-based connections to legislators on relevant committees, 
when combined with necessary resources, will reduce the amount of lobbying that a firm 
will engage in.  
These organizational characteristics (firm wealth and legislative connections) may 
help explain the variation we see in lobbying strategy between different firms at any 
given time, but they do not explain why any firms change their strategies over time. One 
possibility is the ad hoc explanation: firms change their activity over time in response to 
the substantive issues being considered. This is an absolute certainty, but not a systematic 
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explanation. However, both bureaucratic literature and agenda setting literature suggest 
that there is a more systematic dynamic between Congress and the Bureaucracy, which 
we might explore: the relative scope of conflict in the agenda and the resulting principal-
agent relationship. The second variable of interest in this paper is, therefore, 
Congressional polarization.  
Literature suggests that when the “conflict space” is expanded and a large number 
of interests become active in the policy arena, it becomes more challenging for any one 
group to achieve their desired legislative outputs (Drutman 2015). Researchers argue that 
attention is a self-reinforcing cycle, in which as more interest groups pay attention to an 
issue, even more interest groups will begin to pay attention to that same issue; in short, 
they bandwagon (Leech et al. 2005). However, self-reinforcing, or bandwagoning, 
attention is not the only way that the conflict space can be expanded. Substantive policy 
conflict between the parties and between interest groups creates another kind of conflict 
expansion: substantive conflict. Substantive conflict, like conflict between interest 
groups, expands attention to the issue and typically leads to additional lobbying 
(Schattschneider 1957). I argue that the continually increasing polarization in Congress is 
leading to an inevitably widening conflict space and reduced Congressional capacity for 
legislation (Mann and Ornstein 2008). The increased conflict and reduced capacity of 
Congress allows interest groups to increasingly push their legislative agendas, act as 
mediators and negotiators, and offer policy solutions. And, while lobbying budgets are 
not zero-sum, I expect that a drastic increase in lobbying in one venue will inevitably lead 
to some reduction in other venues as interest groups re-calculate how to allocate budgets 
that are not unlimited.  
Hypothesis 2: Polarization will lead to an increase in lobbying activity in Congress, and 
as a result, will reduce lobbying efforts in the bureaucracy and the White House.  
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As a direct counter point to this hypothesis, bureaucratic literature argues that 
ideological conflict has a distinct impact on the agencies involved in an issue area by 
expanding or restricting their freedom to legislate through rulemaking.18 Bureaucratic 
literature suggests that when the two chambers of the legislature are of the same party 
(unified), but the executive branch is controlled by the opposite party, legislators are 
more likely to use statutory controls over the bureaucracy (Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 
2001). In other words, they will write more detailed legislation, giving the bureaucracy 
less discretion over the implementation process. The opposite is true when legislators 
have less capacity (Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001). In other words, when the two 
chambers are divided, the bureaucracy will have more discretion for implementation 
because the legislature may be unable to agree on more detailed legislation. They 
effectively “pass the buck,” as it were, to the implementing agency. This logic, when 
extended, leads to the conclusion that organizations will need to lobby the bureaucracy 
far more during periods of divided Congress than they would under unified conditions in 
the legislature. I therefore test the effect of a divided Congress on lobbying behavior as 
well.19  
Hypothesis 3: Interest groups will lobby the bureaucracy more heavily during periods of 
divided Congress, and less heavily during periods of unified Congress.  
THE DATA 
In order to test these hypotheses, I combine Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) data 
with data from the Compustat Database (both are described in detail shortly), to create an 
original time series cross sectional database of lobbying firms.  
                                                
18 Because bureaucratic rules carry the force of law, bureaucracies can be considered to legislate as 
effectively as Congress does.  
19 The correlation between the average polarization in Congress and whether or not Congress is divided is 
0.493. This level of colinearity is acceptably low, and allows me to use both measures in the same model.  
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The original LDA of 1995 required lobbying reports from any organization 
spending or earning more than $10,000 in a six-month period on lobbying the federal 
government; the legislation has since been updated to cover organizations that spend 
more than $3000 on lobbying activities during a given quarter (Lobbying Disclosure Act 
Guidance 2013). While these disclosure reports are limited in what they contain, it 
provides useful quantifiable measures on lobbying activity, including the issue area 
interests lobbied in, the number of lobbyists they hired, the institution the lobbyists 
targeted, and the total amount of money an organization spent on lobbying efforts in a 
given quarter.  
The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) has compiled and cleaned all registered 
lobbying expenditures that have been disclosed through the LDA. This cleaning includes 
name disambiguation, and excludes legal expenditures or other non-lobbying 
expenditures. However, relatively recent institutional rule changes have affected the 
structure of the data in ways that must be accounted for when performing analysis.  
Analysis for this research begins with the year 1998 and extends through the year 
2013. However, prior to 2008 lobbying interests were required to report semi-annually, 
rather than quarterly. To account for this, a dummy variable was created for the law-
change in 2007 and beginning in 2008.  
This provides me with a cross-sectional time series data set of lobbying firms 
from 1998-2013. I then matched this set of lobbying firms to a dataset downloaded from 
WRDS KnowledgeBase Compustat database. The Compustat dataset includes historical 
descriptive information (headquarter location and revenue, among other things) on stocks 
from both active and inactive companies from the NYSE, NYSE MKT, NASDAQ and 
Arca exchanges. Because firms were named inconsistently in the lobbying data (a 
function of how firms fill out their reporting forms), I hand-matched the two datasets, 
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resulting in a combined data set including 277 unique publicly traded firms who reported 
lobbying in the agriculture sector over the 15 year time period. The unit of analysis is 
firm year, yielding 988 observations.  
Between 1998 and 2013 lobbying reports increased steadily, across all 
institutions. The below graph illustrates that the number of reports made by firms during 
that time span, by institution. It is important to note that the number of reports nearly 
doubles in 2008, as new reporting requirements went into effect. I do control for this 
change in reporting requirements in the regression analysis that follows. 
 
 
Figure 1: Firm Lobbying Reports by Institution and Year 
METHODS  
In order to test the hypotheses enumerated above, I perform a negative binomial 
regression on the cross sectional, time series data described here (Table 1). The 
dependent variable is the number of times a firm reported lobbying Congress, the 
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bureaucracy, or the White House, in a given year.20 Lobbying the White House includes 
those groups who reported lobbying “White House,” “Joint Chiefs of Staff,” and “Vice 
President’s Office.” A group has lobbied Congress if they reported lobbying either the 
“US Senate or the US House of Representatives.” Finally, lobbying the bureaucracy is 
considered lobbying any other agency. Agencies include the US Fish and Wildlife 
Service, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Food and Drug Administration, 
and many others. Negative binomial is appropriate, as the distribution on the dependent 
variable is non-normal. Most groups lobby somewhat inconsistently, and often lobby 
relatively little when they do report lobbying (meaning that the data is skewed). Figures 2 
through 4 illustrate this skewedness by showing histograms of the number of firms that 
file just one or two reports over the 15 years, and the very few number of firms who file 
many more reports during that same time period.  
Among the universe of firms that reported lobbying, the mean number of 
lobbying reports that a firm filed for lobbing Congress in a given year was 10, with the 
minimum number being 0 and the maximum number being 84. The mean number of 
reports that a firm filed for lobbying the bureaucracy during the same time period was 
also 10 and the minimum 0, but the maximum was 104. The White House saw much less 
lobbying activity, with the mean number of reports at only .5 (most firms reported 0 
lobbying in the White House), the minimum being 0, and the maximum being 15 reports. 
 
                                                
20 A new lobbying report can be triggered by hiring a new lobbyist; lobbying on a new bill; a new filing 
quarter; or lobbying a different agency or branch of government.  
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Figure 2. Histogram of Firm Lobbying Reports Filed for Congress 
 
















0 20 40 60 80















0 20 40 60 80 100
Reports of Lobbying Bureaucracy
 49 
  
Figure 4. Histogram of Firm Lobbying Reports Filed for White House  
Independent variables include the number of groups lobbying in the Agricultural 
arena in any given year, ranging from 31 to 104 groups, and the number of hearings on 
agriculture bills in Congress in a given year (ranging from 10 to 69) (Comparative 
Agendas Project: United States n.d.). These two factors are used as proxies for relative 
crowding of the agenda space and attention to the issue area at any given time.21 
Congressional polarization is measured as an average of Rosenthal and Poole’s House 
and Senate polarization means on the first dimension (2015). I also included a measure of 
divided Congress since the bureaucracy literature specifies division rather than 
polarization. Polarization and Congressional division are not correlated, because as 
Figure 5 illustrates, the average polarization score in Congress has steadily increased over 
time, without regard to the unification or division of Congress.  
                                                
21 Lobbying on particular bills is severely underreported, and was not required until 2008. It is therefore 
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Figure 5: Average of Polarization in the House and Senate over time 
Organizational capacity is measured by revenue as reported in Compustat, divided 
by 1,000 (to make the number less unwieldy). Another variable is the number of 
representatives on relevant committees that a firm can claim to be a constituent of, based 
on the location of a firm’s headquarters (retrieved from Compustat). I consider relevant 
committees to be the Agriculture Committee, the Appropriations Committee, the Budget 
Committee, and Party Leadership. I also include an interaction term between firm 
revenue and firm location (congressional connections measure).22 This is intended to 
account for the possibility that firms who are both wealthy and particularly well 
connected may have more influence and power than other firms. 
 
                                                
22 The interaction term is the firm revenue (divided by 1000 for a smaller number), multiplied times the 

















































































































































































Table 1: Incident Rate Ratios, Negative Binomial Regression Results for Firm Lobbying 
Strategy 
Coefficients in parenthesis 
N = 988 
**Significant at the 0.01 level 
*Significant at the 0.05 level  
 
Notably, firm revenue is not normally distributed, as Figure 6 illustrates.  
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Figure 6: Histogram of Firm Revenue, in Thousands 
The mean firm revenue is just 21.5 thousand, but the maximum firm revenue is 
433.5 thousand. I therefore split the dataset along the mean and run the regression for 
firms at and below the mean (“small firms”), and separately for firms above the mean 
(“large firms”). Firms below the mean include Kellog, Hershey’s Horizon Organics, and 
Land O’ Lakes. Firms above the mean include CocaCola, Tyson, McDonalds, and 
Walmart. ConAgra is an example of a firm that falls above the mean some years, and 
falls below it others.  
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Table 2: Incident Rate Ratios, Negative Binomial Regression Results for Small Firm Lobbying Strategy 
Coefficients in parenthesis  
 
N = 733 
**Significant at the 0.01 level 
*Significant at the 0.05 level  
+ Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Table 3: Incident Rate Ratios, Negative Binomial Regression Results for Large Firm Lobbying Strategy 
Coefficients in parenthesis  
 
N = 259 
**Significant at the 0.01 level 
*Significant at the 0.05 level  
+ Significant at the 0.10 level 
RESULTS 
 Table 1 shows that Polarization clearly increases lobbying in Congress. While it 
might be tempting to believe that this is a time trend – polarization is going up over time, 
and lobbying in Congress is increasing over time – it is not a time trend. If it were a time 
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trend, then polarization would also be significant in predicting the increase in lobbying in 
the Bureaucracy and White House, since lobbying has increased over time in these 
venues as well. 
 
 
Figure 7: The Predicted Effect of Polarization on Reports of Lobbying Congress 
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Figure 8: The Predicted Effect of Polarization on Reports of Lobbying Bureaucracy 
 
Figure 9: The Predicted Effect of Polarization on Reports of Lobbying the White House 
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In support of Hypothesis 2, Figure 7 shows the clear relationship between 
increased polarization and increased lobbying in Congress; while Figures 8 and 9 show 
no relationship (and a slightly negative trend in the case of lobbying bureaucracy).  
 In contradiction to Hypothesis 1, Table 1 also indicates that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between the Revenue and Location Interaction. However, as 
Figure 10 illustrates, the confidence interval widens enormously as the revenue and 
location interaction term gets larger. 
 
 
Figure 10: The Predicted Effect of the Interaction Between Revenue and Location on Reports of Lobbying 
Congress  
Tables 2 and 3 provide a more nuanced picture of the effects of polarization, and of the 
interaction between revenue and location, on lobbying. Table 2 indicates that polarization 
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does not have a significant effect on the lobbying decisions of smaller firms. However, 
the revenue and location interaction term does have somewhat more of an effect. 
 
 
Figure 11: The Predicted Effect of the Interaction Between Revenue and Location on Reports of Lobbying 




Figure 12: The Predicted Effect of the Interaction Between Revenue and Location on Reports of Lobbying 
Congress for Large Firms 
 
Figure 13: The Predicted Effect of the Interaction Between Revenue and Location on Reports of Lobbying 
the Bureaucracy for Small firms 
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Tables 2 and 3 also provide a clearer test of Hypothesis 1, which predicted that 
constituency-based connections to legislators on relevant committees, when combined 
with necessary resources, will reduce the amount of lobbying that a firm will engage in. 
Figure 12 indicates that, among small firms, there is a positive relationship between 
lobbying in Congress and the interaction of revenue and location. Figure 13 illustrates the 
negative relationship, for small firms, between lobbying the bureaucracy and the revenue 
and location interaction term. Having a combination of constituency-based connections to 
members of Congress and relatively high revenue (within smaller firms) is associated 
with an increase in lobbying in Congress and a decrease in lobbying in the bureaucracy. 
But, do large firms behave similarly?  
As Table 3 indicates, a larger revenue-location interaction term does not result in 
more lobbying in Congress; however, as Figure 14 shows, it does result in increased 




Figure 14: The Predicted Effect of the Interaction Between Revenue and Location on Reports of Lobbying 
the Bureaucracy for Large Firms  
Polarization is also important in determining large-firm strategy.  Tables 15 and 16 
illustrate that, for large firms, as polarization increases it drives up lobbying in Congress, 
and drives down lobbying in the bureaucracy.  
 
 





Figure 16: The Predicted Effect of Congressional Polarization Reports of Lobbying the Bureaucracy for 
Large Firms  
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that interest groups will lobby the bureaucracy 
more heavily during periods of divided Congress, and less heavily during periods of 
unified Congress, does not find support in any of the regressions. The presence of a 
divided Congress appears not to affect lobbying strategy. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Corporate lobbyists clearly respond to the political environment in which they 
work. However, their responses are contingent on the characteristics of the firm they 
represent. Larger firms are considerably more responsive to political polarization than 
smaller firms; and as Congressional polarization has increased, large firms have ramped 
up their lobbying in Congress and reduced it in the bureaucracy. Smaller firms, on the 
other hand, are more likely to lobby Congress, and less likely to lobby the bureaucracy, 
when they have some combination of revenue (and therefore a larger number of 
constituents they can claim to speak for) and geographical ties to relevant members of 
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Congress. These distinctly different priorities speak to the limitations of lobbying firms. 
The discussion that follows operates under the assumption that firms are rational enough 
to utilize the lobbying strategies that they find to be the most effective.  
The difference between small and large firm lobbying indicates that firms with 
fewer resources are more tightly bound to traditional lobbying techniques that rely on 
constituency-based connections. Smaller firms are more restricted in their capacity for 
influence, since firm wealth is highly predictive of the ability for firms to engage in 
lobbying activity (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Mathur and Singh 2011). Those firms 
who can make the argument that they represent a constituency-group find it more 
effective to rely on members of Congress in relevant committees than on bureaucrats. 
This lobbying strategy looks very similar to the strategies described in previous literature 
– lobbying groups generally focus on committees, and particularly on those members 
with whom they have a constituency-based relationship. (J. M. de Figueiredo and Richter 
2013; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999).  
However, for larger firms who are less constrained, lobbying can become more 
about strategy than about survival. Congressional polarization is widening the conflict 
space in new, unprecedented ways and is tearing apart the traditional coalitions that have 
bound the agricultural subsystem, in particular (A. Sheingate 2013). As polarization is 
chipping away at Congressional Capacity, large firms are directing more of their 
lobbying energies to Congress and away from the bureaucracy. This suggests that firms 
that have the resources to expand beyond their direct Congressional connections see a 
polarized Congress as an increased opportunity to insert their preferred legislative 
provisions and to shape the direction of public policy. If we believe that firms act even 
somewhat rationally, then the conclusion must be that polarization is creating a new 
space for corporate influence in politics.  
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Why does it matter that polarization is creating opportunity for increased 
corporate influence in the Agricultural subsystem? Because, agricultural policy touches 
nearly all areas of American life. Food and agricultural policy impacts everything from 
public health crises like diabetes and heart disease; natural security, for instance, the 
number of young people who are physically fit enough to serve in the military; 
diplomacy, consider the food for peace program; and education, research shows that 
children who are malnourished are less able to perform in school and more likely to end 
up in trouble (Brock and Sparrow 2016). Pluralism demands that corporate lobbying, like 
other kinds of lobbying, be allowed; but there is reason to worry when it appears that 
corporations are ramping up their lobbying efforts at the same time that Congress appears 
to have less capacity for self-regulation. 
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Chapter 4: Polarization and Congressional Lobbying 
In an era of polarized politics, it is more important than ever to understand the 
role of lobbying in public policymaking. As conflict between and within the parties 
makes compromise difficult (Black and Black 2007; Brewer 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 
2000; Sinclair 2006a), lobbyists are finding new ways to insert themselves in to the 
process of negotiation (Andres 2009; Franklin 2014). However, political scientists know 
surprisingly little about exactly how polarization affects lobbying behavior, in part 
because this is simply uncharted territory.  
This chapter delves in to food and agricultural lobbying behavior across the broad 
array of lobbying group types: from firms, to interest groups, to unions and local 
governments. In particular, it asks: does polarization increase lobbying across all types of 
groups, or is this finding exclusive to firms? And, does Congressional polarization create 
space for a larger number of groups to lobby, or does it dampen the desire of interest 
groups to get involved?  
To answer these questions, this chapter uses data from lobbying on food and 
agricultural policy. The food and agricultural policy subsystem presents a perfect case to 
answer the questions presented above. First, the agricultural policy arena had been, until 
quite recently, highly bipartisan; yet it now finds itself in the middle of a bitter partisan 
battle over government spending (Good 2014; Neely 2013; A. Sheingate 2013). This 
recent shift in subsystem dynamics presents the opportunity to look at the behavior 
changes wrought by sudden polarization. We have the opportunity to observe a distinct 
political shift that changes the lobbying environment for interest groups. Second, 
agricultural policy is substantively essential to American health, national security, and is 
a centerpiece of domestic politics (Brock and Sparrow 2016; Poppendieck 2011; Warren 
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2017). Agricultural policy presents, in this historical moment, a substantively vital natural 
experiment with regards to how polarization and lobbying interact to make public policy. 
I begin with a discussion of polarization in politics and how subsystem conflict 
affects interest group behavior. By connecting these literatures, I propose a theory of 
increased lobbying intensity in Congress in response to polarization. I then present the 
research and discuss my findings.  
POLARIZATION IN POLITICS  
The United States is in a new era of increased polarization, in which liberals are 
becoming more liberal, and conservatives more conservative (Black and Black 2007; 
Brewer 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 2000; Sinclair 2006a). The distance between the 
parties, and between the members therein is wider now than it has been in recent 
memory. And this polarization is not only focused on issues that have been historically 
high salience like abortion or welfare. Research indicates that increasing polarization is 
leading to conflict extension: previously agreed upon issues are becoming newly 
polarized; new cleavages are forming where they did not exist before (Layman et al. 
2010).  
The formation of new cleavages is clearly visible in the agricultural policy space. 
The passage of the 2013 Farm Bill (the Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2013) 
was possibly the most bitterly partisan process in farm bill history, as hard line 
Republicans worked to the supplementary nutrition assistance program away from farm 
subsidies, or to strip SNAP down to bare bones at the very least (Neely 2013; A. 
Sheingate 2013). And yet, or perhaps because of this bitter fighting, the 2013 farm bill 
was the 6th most heavily lobbied bill, in dollars, of that year (Top Bills: 2013 n.d.).  
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As the farm bill of 2013 illustrates – conflict over policy can potentially occur on 
two levels. First: conflict can occur between the parties and the extremes therein 
(polarization), and second: conflict can occur between interest groups who are lobbying 
for their preferred policy outcomes. But, is conflict between interest groups really what is 
occurring? 
Subsystem literature tells us that, as there is more competition in a subsystem, it 
drives interest groups to become specialists (find niches) in order to secure a competitive 
advantage with other groups (Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Browne 1990; Lowery et al. 
2012). Interest groups are thus actually avoiding competition with each other.  
Interest groups need resources to survive, and subsystem density puts a premium 
on those resources (Lowery et al. 2012). Instead of competing, they specialize. Within 
this literature there is conflict over the effect interest group crowding and specialization 
has on participation. Lowery et al. (2012) find that interest groups do specialize, but 
nonetheless their participation declines as the subsystem becomes more crowded. Others 
find that as government grows there is more room for interest group activity 
(Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Benz et al. 2011; Leech et al. 2005), meaning that interest 
group participation need not decline, it only needs to specialize. Conflict between interest 
groups is therefore not conflict over policy outcomes, but rather, conflict over resources; 
a conflict that interest groups are largely able to solve by specializing. 
But what about conflict caused by polarization? The effect of conflict caused by 
polarization on lobbying behavior is a surprising lacuna in political science literature. It is 
clear that political environment impacts lobbying behavior – from the intensity with 
which groups lobby to the kind of groups that lobby (Boehmke 2005; Dusso 2010; 
Plotnick and Winters 1990). Political environment, in these studies, includes dimensions 
such as a whether the government allows citizen initiatives (Boehmke 2005); the amount 
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of uncertainty regarding possible legislative outcomes (Dusso 2010); and the 
competitiveness of parties within the governing system (Plotnick and Winters 1990).  
To counter these studies, bureaucracy literature argues that ideological conflict 
between the chambers of Congress will reduce congressional capacity to legislate, 
leading Congress to delegate more rulemaking authority to agencies. This literatures 
suggests that when the two chambers of the legislature are of the same party (unified), but 
the executive branch is controlled by the opposite party, legislators are more likely to use 
statutory controls over the bureaucracy (Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001). When the two 
chambers are divided, the bureaucracy will have more discretion for implementation 
because the legislature may be unable to agree on more detailed legislation; they 
effectively “pass the buck,” to the implementing agency. On the one hand, this logic 
implies that Congressional conflict would drive lobbying toward the agency (as the 
agency is given more authority); but on the other hand, polarization does not correlate 
highly with unified or divided government. Polarization increases steadily, while party 
control of Congress’s chambers has alternated periodically.  
The literature explores party control of Congress, uncertainty over legislative 
outcomes, the intensity of lobbying, and the electoral competitiveness of parties. These 
environmental factors, while not measures of polarization, provide us with clues as to 
how polarization may affect lobbying behavior. If party competition and uncertainty 
appear to lead to more lobbying (Dusso 2010; Gray et al. 2015; Plotnick and Winters 
1990), then it is reasonable to suppose that polarization might similarly do so.  
Gray et al. (2015) predict that polarization will lead to increased lobbying, 
however, their findings are more complicated. They find that non-profit groups lobby 
more in response to polarization, but that for-profit groups lobby less in response to 
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polarization (Gray et al. 2015). For-profit interest groups are, Gray et al argue, not 
interested in becoming tarred with a party brush, they prefer to remain bipartisan.  
But Gray et al.s findings are the state level. What about at the federal level? There 
is little research on the specific impact of polarization on for-profit advocacy at the 
federal level. However, we do know that politics in the US are highly polarized (Black 
and Black 2007; Brewer 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 2000); and that the majority of 
lobbying in the United States is done by corporations and trade associations, rather than 
ideological or membership-based groups (Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty 2013; J. M. de 
Figueiredo 2004). It does not, therefore, appear that polarization is dampening corporate 
enthusiasm for political advocacy. But is it increasing it? And is polarization increasing 
lobbying among other not-for-profit groups, as Gray et al (2015) assert?  
This chapter expands upon the possibility of polarization driving lobbying 
behavior, and considers how different types of lobbying interest groups might respond to 
partisanship in different ways.   
POLARIZATION DRIVES LOBBYING  
While party competition and uncertainty appear to lead to more lobbying (Dusso 
2010; Gray et al. 2015; Plotnick and Winters 1990), polarization and party competition 
are not the same. Competition is how likely each party is to win any given election, while 
polarization is the distance between the center and the most extreme members of the 
parties. However, one might speculate that party competition and polarization would 
function similarly, depending on how we conceive of polarization. 
Polarization could, arguably be conceived of as adding to certainty, or 
diminishing certainty. Once an issue is polarized, presumably certainty is increased, in 
the sense that we, as constituents, are clear on where Republicans and Democrats each 
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stand on that issue. However, polarization, in the context of a competitive party system, 
would lead to highly increased uncertainty for politically active groups. In a system that 
is both competitive and highly polarized, as a new party gains control of the legislature, 
the legislative outputs sought by that party would be drastically different from those 
sought by the party formerly in control; thus creating potentially wild swings in policy, 
and high uncertainty for interested advocacy groups.  
Uncertainty is not the only reason why polarization might drive increases in 
interest group activity. Andres (2009) argues that lobbyists serve as a conduit for indirect 
communication, bridging the ideological divide, and negating between the parties and 
members of Congress. Polarization increases Congressional reliance on the services of 
lobbyists.  
The evidence in this chapter cannot distinguish between the motivations of 
reducing uncertainty or increasing influence, however, there is no reason why these goals 
should be mutually exclusive for an interest group. In both cases, polarization should 
drive a considerable increase in lobbying activity.23  
Hypothesis 1: Congressional polarization will increase lobbying in Congress.  
But will polarization drive increase lobbying among all interest groups, or does it 
drive lobbying only among certain kinds of groups? Gray et al (2015) find that it does not 
increase lobbying among all groups. As noted, they find that for-profit interest groups 
lobby less in highly polarized state governments, than in less polarized state 
governments. Perhaps federal lobbying is different? If Andres (2009) is correct that 
lobbyists act as go-betweens in a divided government, and therefore have increased 
influence, then it seems reasonable that for-profit companies would have as much, if not 
                                                
23 By this, I mean an increase in the number of reports an interest group files for lobbying an institution in a 
given year. New reports may be triggered by hiring a new lobbyist; lobbying on a new bill; a few filing 
quarter; or lobbying a different agency or branch of government.  
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more, motivation to lobby under polarized conditions, give than firms may experience a 
return of over $220 for every $1 spent on lobbying (Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz 2009).  
Further, the literature on interest group niches indicates that when interest groups 
face competition and conflict from other interest groups, they specialize to avoid direct 
competition for resources (Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Benz et al. 2011; Leech et al. 
2005). Perhaps interest groups are able to adapt similarly to polarization. It is possible 
that interest groups find ways to become more policy-content savvy to avoid larger 
political fights. Based on the argument that interest groups are finding additional 
influence under polarized conditions, I predict that all lobbying groups (both firms and 
not-for-profit interests) will increase their lobbying intensity in Congress.  
Hypothesis 2: Congressional polarization will increase the amount of lobbying done in 
Congress by both not-for-profit interest groups and corporate groups.  
This leads to the question: what does polarization do to lobbying in the 
bureaucracy? On the one hand, lobbying budgets, while likely not entirely inelastic, are 
likely not infinitely expandable. I predict that when groups devote more resources to 
lobbying in one institution, they will ultimately devote fewer resources to other 
institutions (such as the bureaucracy and the white house), either because they have 
achieved the majority of their policy goals through legislation and need only see it 
through to implementation (which should, theoretically, require fewer resources if the 
bureaucracy implements Congress’s directions), or because they have not achieved their 
policy preferences in Congress and therefore have no hope of achieving them in the 
bureaucracy.  
Hypothesis 3: Congressional polarization will lead to reduced intensity of lobbying in the 
bureaucracy and White House.   
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Congressional polarization will, then, lead to a lower intensity (measured by 
number of reports, per group) of lobbying in the bureaucracy and White House, but an 
increased intensity of lobbying in Congress. I hypothesize that polarization is creating a 
trade off of lobbying intensity, where Congress is receiving an increasing amount of 
attention as groups try to accomplish their legislative priorities.  
THE DATA  
 In order to test these hypotheses, I combine Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) data 
with Poole and Roosenthal’s DWNOMINATE polarization scores (2015), and several 
other measures of political environment such as a measure of divided congress (house 
and senate controlled by different parties), and the number of Congressional hearings on 
Agriculture, gathered from the Policy Agendas Project (Comparative Agendas Project: 
United States n.d.).  
The original LDA of 1995 required lobbying reports from any organization 
spending or earning more than $10,000 in a six-month period on lobbying the federal 
government; the legislation has since been undated to cover organizations that spend 
more than $3,000 on lobbying activities during a given quarter (Lobbying Disclosure Act 
Guidance 2013). While these disclosure reports are limited in what they contain, it 
provides useful quantifiable measures of lobbying activity, including the issue area 
interest groups lobbied in, the number of lobbyists they hired, the institution the lobbyists 
targeted, and the total amount of money an organization spent on lobbying efforts in a 
given quarter.  
The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) has compiled and cleaned all registered 
lobbying expenditures that have been disclosed through the LDA. This cleaning includes 
name disambiguation, and excludes legal expenditures or other non-lobbying 
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expenditures. However, relatively recent institutional rule changes have affected the 
structure of the data in ways that must be accounted for when performing analysis.  
Analysis for this research begins with the year 1998 and extends through the year 
2013. Prior to 2008 lobbying interests were required to report semi-annually, rather than 
quarterly. To account for this, a dummy variable was created for the law-change in 2007, 
which took effect in 2008.  
This provides a cross-sectional time series data set of lobbying interest groups 
from 1998-2013. There were a total of 2,679 interest groups who reported lobbying in 
Agriculture during this time period, and the unit of analysis is interest group by year, 
yielding a total of 10,77 observations. 
Between 1998 and 2013 lobbying reports increased steadily, across all 
institutions. The below graph illustrates the number of reports made by interest groups 
during that time span, by institution. It is important to note that the number of reports 
nearly doubles in 2008, as new reporting requirements went into effect. I do control for 
the change in reporting requirements in the regression analysis that follows.  
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Figure 17: All Lobbying Reports in Agriculture by Institution and Year 
METHODS 
In order to test the hypotheses enumerated above, I perform a negative binomial 
regression on the cross sectional, time series data described here (Table 4). The 
dependent variable is the number of times a group reported lobbying Congress, the 
bureaucracy, or the White House, in a given year. All groups were hand coded according 
to type, and a 10% sample was blind coded using a multiple coder method.24 39% of the 
groups fall into the category of corporation / firm (3,872 groups), 54% of the groups are 
categorized as interest groups (5,488 groups), 6% are local government (603), and 1% are 
unions (114 groups). 73 individuals or groups were dropped from analysis (coded as 
                                                
24 Krippendorff’s alpha inter-coder reliability scores are as follows: .768 for firms; .332 for nonprofits, 
originally a distinct code, which was subsumed under the category of “interest groups” because of this low 
score; .724 for “interest groups;” .716 for “local government;” 1 for “unions;” and -0.005 for “other,” a 
category of 73 groups which was dropped from analysis. Krippendorff (2004) states that tentative 
conclusions are acceptable with a score of greater than .667, while a score of .800 is preferable. These 
scores for codes used here are generally nearer the .800 level, than the .667 level.   
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“other”), as those 73 lobbying individuals or groups are not useful to the analysis here. 25 
The complete codebook can be found in Appendix A.  
Lobbying the White House includes those groups who reported lobbying “White 
House,” “Joint Chiefs of Staff,” and “Vice President’s Office.” A group has lobbied 
Congress if they reported lobbying either the “US Senate or the US House of 
Representatives.” Finally, lobbying the bureaucracy is considered lobbying any other 
agency. Agencies include the US Fish and Wildlife Service, US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, the Food and Drug Administration, and many others. Negative 
binomial is appropriate, as the distribution on the dependent variable is non-normal. Most 
groups lobby somewhat inconsistently, and many groups lobby very little when they do 
report lobbying (meaning that the data is skewed).  Figures 18 through 20 illustrate this 
skewness by showing histograms of the number of groups that file just one or two reports 
over the 15 years, and the very few number of groups who file many more reports during 
that same time period.  
Among the universe of all groups that reported lobbying, the mean number of 
lobbying reports a group filed for lobbying Congress in a given year was 7, while the 
minimum was 0 reports and the maximum was 95 reports. The mean number of reports 
that a firm filed for lobbying the bureaucracy during the same time period was 8 and the 
minimum 0, but the maximum was 448 reports. The White House saw much less 
lobbying activity, with the mean number of reports at .8 (most firms reported 0 lobbying 
in the White House), the minimum being 0, and the maximum being 32 reports. 
                                                
25 The group “other,” includes individuals (21), countries (5), and groups that could not be classified (47) 
because there was no information available about them. For example, the following are included in this 
category: “8900 lines,” “Jim Bradshaw,” “EYT,” and “Network.”  
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Figure 18. Histogram of All Lobbying Reports Filed for Congress 
 
Figure 19. Histogram of All Lobbying Reports Filed for Bureaucracy 
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Figure 20. Histogram of All Lobbying Reports Filed for White House  
I include group type as a factor independent variable, with “firms” as the base 
category, which allows for comparison of the lobbying intensity between different types 
of groups. Other independent variables include the number of groups lobbying in the 
Agricultural arena in any given year, ranging from 372 groups lobbying in a year, to a 
maximum of 908 groups lobbying; and the number of hearings on agriculture bills in 
Congress in a given year (ranging from 10 to 69) (Comparative Agendas Project: United 
States n.d.). These two factors are used as proxies for relative crowding of the agenda 
space and attention to the issue area at any given time.26 Congressional polarization is 
measured as an average of Rosenthal and Poole’s House and Senate polarization means 
on the first dimension (2015). I also included a measure of divided Congress since the 
bureaucracy literature specifies division rather than polarization. Polarization and 
Congressional division are not correlated, because as Figure 5 (page 49) illustrates, the 
                                                
26 Lobbying on particular bills is severely underreported, and was not required until 2008. It is therefore 
not possible to account for precisely how many groups lobby on any given issue. 
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average polarization score in Congress has steadily increased over time, without regard to 
the unification or division of Congress. Finally, I include measures for the lobbying 
toward other institutions that a group did in a given year. 
















































    

























Table 4: Incident Rate Ratios, Negative Binomial Regression Results for Lobbying 
Strategies, base category firms 
Coefficients in parenthesis 
N = 10,077 
**Significant at the 0.01 level 
*Significant at the 0.05 level  
+ Significant at the 0.10 level 
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I also run negative binomial regressions separately for firms only, and interest 
groups only. This allows me to compare the independent variables that affect firm 
lobbying intensity to those that affect interest group lobbying intensity. 
 






















































Table 5: Incident Rate Ratios, Negative Binomial Regression Results for Interest Group 
Lobbying Strategy 
Coefficients in parenthesis 
N = 5,488 
**Significant at the 0.01 level 
*Significant at the 0.05 level  


























































Table 6: Incident Rate Ratios, Negative Binomial Regression Results for Firm Lobbying 
Strategies 
Coefficients in parenthesis 
N = 3,872 
**Significant at the 0.01 level 
*Significant at the 0.05 level  
+ Significant at the 0.10 level 
RESULTS  
Table 4 shows that hypothesis 1 is correct, and hypothesis 3 is partially correct: 
polarization increases lobbying intensity in Congress, and drastically reduces it in the 
bureaucracy; however, polarization does not have a statistically significant effect on 
lobbying in the White House. While it might be tempting to believe that the relationship 
between polarization and lobbying in Congress is a time trend – polarization is going up 
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over time, and lobbying in Congress is increasing over time – it is not a time trend. If it 
were a time trend then polarization would also have a positive effect on lobbying in the 




Figure 21: The Predicted Effect of Polarization on Reports of Lobbying Congress 
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Figure 22: The Predicted Effect of Polarization on Reports of Lobbying Bureaucracy 
The number of Congressional hearings in Agriculture has a small, but positive 
and significant effect on lobbying in Congress, and a correspondingly small and negative 
effect on lobbying in the Bureaucracy and White House.  
Table 4 also demonstrates that both interest groups and local governments lobby 
Congress with a higher intensity than firms, but that local governments lobby the White 
House considerably less than firms. Nonprofit organizations lobby the bureaucracy less 
than firms; whereas unions have no statistically significant differences from firms in their 
behavior.  
Interestingly, as bureaucratic scholars predict, a divided Congress (where the 
House and Senate are controlled by different parties) does have a positive and significant 
effect on lobbying the bureaucracy. The caveat to this is that, as Tables 5 and 6 show, this 
effect is actually true only for interest groups, and not for firms; who appear to be less 
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responsive, in general, in terms of altering their lobbying in the bureaucracy based on 
political environment.  
In particular, Tables 5 and 6 serve to test hypothesis 2: that Congressional 
polarization increases lobbying in Congress for both interest groups and firms. Tables 5 
and 6 illustrate that polarization has a positive and significant effect on lobbying in 
Congress for both firms and interest groups; and a negative and significant effect (though 
only at the .10 level for firms) when lobbying the bureaucracy.  
The results of the negative binomial regressions, then, show that polarization 
increases then intensity of lobbying in Congress and has a negative effect on lobbying in 
the bureaucracy. This effect is found to be true for both firms and interest groups. The 
results also show that interest groups lobby with a relatively higher intensity than firms in 
Congress, but are not statistically different from firms in their behavior toward the 
bureaucracy or White House.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Interest groups, of all types – from corporate to nonprofit, are responding to 
Congressional polarization by increasing the intensity of their lobbying efforts. This 
behavior strongly suggests that either or both of the following are true: polarization in the 
agricultural subsystem is creating uncertainty that demands a response from interest 
groups; or polarization in the agricultural subsystem is creating the opportunity for 
interest groups to have a larger impact on public policy.  
Taken in concert with Chapters 3 and 5, we can conclude that both of these 
statements are true in degree. Polarization is wrecking havoc on the compromises 
between rural and urban lawmakers that are so historically essential to the construction 
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and passage of farm bills, creating both high uncertainty and new opportunity (Good 
2014; Neely 2013; A. Sheingate 2013).  
If competition between parties increases lobbying because of increased 
uncertainty (Plotnick and Winters 1990), then it is reasonable to conclude that the 
combination of competition between Democrats and Republicans for control over 
government, paired with high polarization within these parties, is creating an 
environment of extreme uncertainty. This extreme uncertainty means that interest groups 
can no longer necessarily rely on long-standing compromises. As deficits run high and 
conservative legislators argue for splitting nutrition titles away from the farm bill, urban 
and rural interests may be pitted against one another for benefits and programmatic funds. 
Yet, there is also opportunity; groups who have historically not been included in the farm 
bill may see this as an opportunity to insert their preferred policy solutions a cheaper or 
more efficient alternatives.  
Importantly, this is true for both general interest groups and for corporate firms/ 
interest groups. Though literature suggests that polarization may decrease corporate 
lobbying (Gray et al. 2015), these findings indicate that corporations, like other interest 
groups, are responding to polarization in federal government with a considerable increase 
in the intensity of their lobbying efforts in Congress.  
As these results show, the increased intensity of lobbying Congress is clearly 
coming at the expense of lobbying at the administrative level. This leads to the question: 
how does a shift in lobbying toward Congress and away from the bureaucracy affect 
policy outputs? Answering this question would require both an analysis of how 
delegation to the bureaucracy has changed over time (has Congress begun to delegate 
less, thus reducing the necessity of lobbying bureaucracies?), and in-depth interviews 
with interest groups to clarify how they perceive and respond to winning and losing 
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during the regulatory process. Future research should consider these kinds of questions 
when looking at the trade-offs interest groups make between lobbying in Congress and at 




Chapter 5: He Said, She Said: The Power of Interest Group Negotiations 
“Many years ago there was a senator from Alabama, by the name of Howell 
Heflin, who served on the Ag committee throughout his tenure. He saw a lot of 
farm bills come and go, and for three consecutive farm bills, when we would meet 
in the Senate, the first day of debate he would give his opening speech. He would 
always say “Mr. Chairman, I don’t know why we’re here meeting yet, because we 
can’t talk about the farm bill because all the Ag lobbyists haven’t decided what 
they want yet in the farm bill!” And everybody would always laugh, and they 
knew the speech was coming, but he was right on target. Ultimately, members of 
Congress, when it comes to Agricultural policy, sort out opinions from their 
various friends in the Ag community, from organizations like ours. They’re 
seeking the groups’ input”27 
Congress is (supposed to be) in the business of mediation and negotiation. 
Members must negotiate policy between and amongst themselves, as well as in the wider 
world – considering the demands of public opinion, interested organizations and firms, 
and even concerns related to trade agreements. The process of negotiation between 
members of Congress and the wider world, also known as lobbying, is one that political 
scientists have long been attuned to, and have studied extensively. The Agricultural 
policy arena in particular, is widely considered to be an especially fertile area for study. It 
has a long policy history, beginning in the 1930s, and has expanded in scope and 
importance since. Indeed, the agricultural subsystem has been the subject of many 
subsystem and lobbying studies in political science because of this history, stability, and 
uniquely cooperative nature (Browne 1988, 1995; Hansen 1991; Sheingate 2003, to name 
a few). And indeed, those I interviewed often saw the Agricultural policy area as an 
example of unique cooperation, negotiation, and good policy process. Yet in the same 
                                                
27 Author interview with Chuck Conner, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, Washington DC, 
August 2014. 
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breath, many interviewees also noted the ways that polarization and uncertainty were 
changing the political landscape. 
Chapter three of the dissertation examined corporate lobbying in agriculture and 
noted two particularly important phenomena within corporate political advocacy: that 
financial resources and human capital, in the form of constituency-based relationships 
with members of Congress, appear to amplify each other when lobbying Congress, and 
reduce the need to lobby bureaucracy; and that polarization appears to be increasing 
lobbying efforts in Congress. Chapter four found similar results. This chapter digs deeper 
into the possible motivations driving lobbying strategies, and extends the findings beyond 
corporations to other types of interest groups. This chapter also explores the path 
dependent nature of political advocacy and how polarization may be shaking existing 
relationships while simultaneously further entrenching the role of interest groups in 
policy making.  
Path dependency is essentially inertia: history and past decisions shape the 
possible choices and decisions we make in the future (Pierson 2004). A thing set in 
motion tends to continue in the same direction unless interrupted or redirected by an 
external source. This is true not just of individuals, but also of organizations and 
government institutions. As previously noted, the agricultural subsystem has a unique 
reputation as stable and conciliatory; it is an environment in which lawmakers have 
historically worked across party lines and where unique coalitions have flourished. 
However, polarization is rapidly changing relationships in Congress and destabilizing 
even the more long-standing and cross-cutting policy arenas (Good 2014; McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2008; A. Sheingate 2013). Polarization is a disruptive force in the 
historical path of the agricultural subsystem. This chapter considers how that disruption 
affects relationships inside the subsystem, and how that might affect legislative 
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outcomes. I argue that as long-standing coalitions between urban and rural lawmakers are 
shaken, interest groups increasingly insert themselves into the policy process.  
The chapter will begin by discussing the current literature around lobbying, path 
dependence, and polarization. I then offer a theory advancing the argument that 
polarization represents a disruption in the path of the agricultural subsystem, and set forth 
hypotheses to this effect. I present evidence from interviews in support of this argument, 
and conclude by offering a discussion of the implications.  
STICKINESS, DISRUPTION, AND POLARIZATION  
Paul Pierson describes the institutional stickiness of government, saying, “despite 
massive social, economic, and political changes over time, self-reinforcing dynamics 
associated with collective action processes – especially high start-up costs, coordination 
effects, and adaptive expectations – mean that organizations will have a strong tendency 
to persist once they are institutionalized” (2004, 34). Lee Drutman, similarly describes 
behavioral stickiness within corporations, “once a company starts lobbying, political 
activity has an institutional stickiness that keeps companies politically engaged, despite 
ebbs and flows in the political agenda” (2015, 8).  
Both the Drutman and Pierson quotes above point to the notion that the 
relationships between government and interest groups are self-reinforcing, and that over 
time they become more entrenched, weathering political and cultural changes. As 
lobbyists form relationships, day after day, week after week, they essentially become an 
informal part of the government apparatus as information providers and feedback 
mechanisms (Austen-Smith 1993; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Segal, Cameron, and Cover 
1992). In fact, the bulk of current lobbying efforts are focused on “education, agenda 
setting, information gathering, interpretation, prediction, and managing uncertainty,” 
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rather than keeping government out of corporate affairs (Andres 2009, 5). As this quote 
illustrates, lobbying is not a one-way flow of information, nor is it solely focused on 
swaying legislative outcomes; lobbying also allows interest groups (and businesses in 
particular) to reduce political and regulatory uncertainty (Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
Drutman 2015; Franklin 2014).  
When it comes to uncertainty, a majority of the uncertainty this chapter is 
concerned with is that which originates from the political sphere: uncertainty as it relates 
to politics and regulation. In the 1970s, businesses began getting involved in political 
advocacy to fight against “big” government and try to avoid increasing regulations 
(Drutman 2015; Waterhouse 2013). Now, corporate lobbying makes up the majority of 
lobbying in American politics (Drutman 2015), and increasing polarization is creating a 
new market for lobbyists who specialize in Republican advocacy or Democrat advocacy 
(Andres 2009, 110). Polarization, then, is one driver of political activity.  
When we consider the effect that polarization has on lobbying, we might initially 
guess that it creates more certainty, in the form of gridlock. However, our political 
system is never in true gridlock; instead we see “punctuated equilibrium,” in which small, 
incremental change is punctuated by quite large changes to policy (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005, 2012). And during times of polarization, the preferences from the 
“winning side,” are very distant from the preferences of the “losing side”; compromise is 
considerably harder and less likely under polarized government (Lee 2009; Sinclair 
2006b; Theriault 2013).  
Under conditions where government is more polarized, and compromise is 
considerably more difficult, lobbying takes on a new importance. Lobbyists can, and do, 
act as go-betweens for Congressional offices. “Lobbyists fill the vacuum created by 
partisanship. Polarization has strengthened their hand in a process where information – 
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particularly intelligence about what is happening on the other side of the aisle – is a 
highly valuable commodity” (Andres 2009, 116).  Andres’s point suggests that 
polarization leads to more access and influence for lobbyists under polarized conditions. 
The path dependent nature of relationships between members of Congress and lobbyists, 
in which lobbyists gain access through long-term provision of useful information 
(Hansen 1991), will become even more essential as polarization divides Congress. 
Polarization essentially creates a positive feedback loop: members of Congress and 
interest groups develop working relationships; the relationships between members of 
Congress become strained from partisan division; lobbying relationships fill the void, 
becoming ever more important.  
This chapter extends the logic set forth here, and explains how Congressional 
polarization and constituency-based relationships between interest groups and members 
of Congress create expanded avenues for interest group influence over policy. Rather 
than laying out a specific set of hypotheses, this chapter will elaborate on the 
expectations and findings in Chapters 3 and 4, providing human-meaning and nuance to 
the statistical findings of these earlier chapters.  
POLARIZATION AND CONSTITUENCY RELATIONSHIPS: THE DEEP CONNECTION  
This section refreshes the arguments and expectations set forth in previous 
chapters. Polarization leads to a breakdown of relationships between members of 
Congress, and makes compromise on policy quite difficult (Lee 2009; Sinclair 2006b; 
Theriault 2013). There is also evidence that when there is electoral competition between 
the parties, policy uncertainty is increased and interest groups have more incentive to 
lobby (Gray et al. 2015). Given the highly competitive of federal elections in the US, and 
the extremely polarized nature of the parties, interest groups are facing a highly uncertain 
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political environment. If Democrats win majorities in the House and Senate, policy 
outcomes can be expected to be wildly different from if Republicans win majorities. 
Because interest groups lobby to reduce the political uncertainty they face, I expect that 
polarization will increase lobbying efforts in Congress.  
If a desire to reduce uncertainty motivates interest groups to lobby, so should 
feelings of efficacy. Interest groups would certainly prefer to use their resources where 
they think these resources will be most valuable. When interest groups are able to speak 
for a member of Congress’s constituency, this is, without a doubt, when that member of 
Congress will be most interested in their perspective (J. M. de Figueiredo and Silverman 
2006; Hansen 1991; Mayhew 1974). Members of congress are single minded seekers of 
reelection (Mayhew 1974), so providing them information about the concerns of their 
district is a sure-fire strategy for political access. Interest groups should be expected to 
know this and use this to their advantage. When an interest group speaks for a member’s 
constituency, they will find themselves with more leverage to effect policy change in 
their preferred direction.   
As polarization increases the amount of lobbying in Congress, and constituency-
based relationships make some groups more effective at lobbying that venue, together 
they create a highly unequal playing-ground. Some groups will inevitably achieve more 
access to key members of Congress because of their ability to speak to that member’s 
reelection prospects. Because of the path dependent nature of lobbying relationships 
(Drutman 2015; Hansen 1991), those groups who initially have something useful to offer 
will find themselves developing deeper and more influential relationships on the Hill over 
time. The degree to which these relationships are fruitful for interest groups in policy 
terms will depend, in part, on the kind of legislating Congress does. The closer an interest 
group’s relationships with members on relevant committees, and the more specific the 
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legislation coming out of those committees, the more impact that group can expect to 
have. If, however, the committee writes loser legislation that allows for considerable 
regulatory interpretation, or if amendments are added on the Congressional floor at the 
last minute, an interest group might face unpleasant surprise.  
Research on the relationship between bureaucracy and Congress suggests that in 
times of high polarization, Congress delegates much less to bureaucracy (Ethridge 2010). 
Polarization, then, strengthens the hand of interest groups who enjoy close relationships 
with members of Congress. Further, polarization results in tighter rules and more control 
over floor amendments, as the majority party tries to block minority party influence 
(Theriault 2013). Polarization then, unintentionally strengthens interest group influence 
over legislation by creating a narrower path to advocacy: advocacy must be effective at 
the committee level, or not at all, under highly polarized conditions. And the committee 
level is where well-connected interest groups enjoy the strongest relationships.  
These expectations suggest that polarization has a positive-feedback effect on 
lobbying: polarization increases the incentive to lobby in order to reduce uncertainty. 
Lobbying in a polarized environment allows interest groups to have increased influence 
over legislators who no longer communicate across the aisle and who tightly control 
legislative outputs, allowing these groups to see better results from their lobbying efforts. 
Further, as groups lobby, their lobbyists are adept at showing positive results, and helping 
groups find more reasons to stay in the political advocacy game (Drutman 2015). While 
previous chapters support the notion that polarization increases the amount of lobbying in 
Congress, statistics cannot show why this phenomenon is occurring. Here I present the 
evidence from a series of interviews with lobbyists, journalists, and staffers, to show that 
polarization increases both the need to lobby, and the efficacy of lobbying – leading 
again to more lobbying. 
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DATA AND METHODS  
The evidence in this chapter is based on a set of 17 interviews conducted with 
lobbyists, legislative staffers, and reporters. I interviewed five trade association lobbyists, 
four congressional staffers, three corporate lobbyists, two contract lobbyists, two 
journalists, and one formal coalition lobbyist. The purpose of these interviews was to 
establish how lobbyists say that they make strategic lobbying decisions, when they 
change strategies, and how their chosen strategies relate to their policy preferences and 
the political environment.  
Interview subjects were first chosen randomly from a data set of all lobbyists who 
worked on the 2008 Farm Bill. Subjects were contacted with an interview request via a 
mailed letter, then via email or phone. Further subjects were determined using snowball 
sampling. At the end of each interview, the subject was asked if he or she knew anyone 
who might be willing to be interviewed on the subject, and those people were contacted. 
Additional subjects were those individuals who were key players during the 2008 Farm 
Bill, such as a senior legislative staffer for the then Chairman of the Senate Agriculture 
and Forestry Committee, and a senior minority staffer for the House Agriculture 
Committee.  
All interviewees were asked a set of pre-determined, basic questions; however, 
the conversation was fairly free form and allowed interviewees to largely steer the 
conversation. Interviews were recorded with permission, and transcribed at a later date. 
All interviewees were allowed to determine whether or not their name would be used in 
association with their comments. 
THE INTERVIEWS: POLITICAL CAPITAL, TRUST, AND POLARIZED POLITICS 
I have argued that polarization is fundamentally changing the way interest groups 
lobby in Washington. And, while it is well established that partisanship is affecting floor 
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and procedural votes (Lee 2009; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2008; Sinclair 2006b; 
Theriault 2008, 2013), partisanship is also finding its way into Congressional committees 
in unprecedented ways.  
Agricultural committee staffers, and staff from member offices, often perceive 
themselves as fairly bipartisan, and even claim to be “one of the most bipartisan 
committees on the hill,” including doing joint meetings and working with committee 
members and staffers from across the aisle.28 These staffers emphasize how difficult it is 
to pass a farm bill on a strict party line vote, particularly when neither party has a super 
majority in the Senate, and the importance of compromise to get legislation that both 
Republicans and Democrats find palatable.29 One staffer noted that, “it’s not that partisan 
divisions are absent, you’ve got some strain,” but that there were still many members 
who were willing to compromise and whose constituency wanted strong farm bills.30 
However, interest groups do not perceive the climate similarly. Interest groups are 
acutely aware of the evolving partisan environment in Washington.  
“When I first started in this business in the 1980s, the staff on the agriculture 
committees were professional staff. They provided analysis, and it wasn’t 
Democrat or Republican; they provided it to both sides. That would be unheard of 
today. Unheard of. Staff are as partisan as the members are.”31  
Others noted that there is more “partisan warfare” in recent years.32 And 
particularly, that the partisan warfare made an already complex process nearly impossible 
                                                
28 Author interview with a staff member for the House Agriculture Committee, Washington DC, August 
2014.  
29 Author interview with Mark Halverson, senior staffer for Tom Harkin, Washington DC, August 2014.  
30 Author interview with Mark Halverson, senior staffer for Senator Tom Harkin (D), Washington DC, 
August 2014. 
31 Author interview with Chuck Conner, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, Washington DC, 
August 2014.  
32 Author interview with Ferd Hoefner, National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, Washington DC, 
August 2014.  
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at times. One lobbyist told the following story of a legislative effort during the 2014 farm 
bill: 
“We were trying to get something in the Senate. But the House would get mad at 
us because we were over in the Senate working on language and we were having 
to find compromise between the Republicans and Democrats to get it through. 
The [House] Republicans would… say “you need to be with us,” but we would 
still have [to compromise with] the Senate Democrats.”33 
In this quote and in other interviews, respondents emphasized that when trying to 
push for particular legislative outcome, negotiating between the institutional and cultural 
differences of the House and Senate is, alone, challenging. However, the current partisan 
climate is throwing an even bigger wrench into the process. Now, groups are not only 
torn between trying to get both chambers on board with their policy preferences, they are 
being asked to take partisan sides in a battle in which few of them have any interest. 
Indeed, lobbyists emphasized repeatedly that they preferred to be non-partisan, that their 
interest group was non-partisan, and that they preferred to work with both Republicans 
and Democrats on every issue in which they were involved.34 Yet, increasingly these 
groups are being asked to take sides.   
How do interest groups cope with this polarized environment? By ramping up 
their lobbying efforts and relying more heavily on coalitions. Almost every lobbyist or 
interest group interviewed emphasized the importance of coalitional work in today’s 
environment,35 and many of these coalitions were “cross-cutting,” in the sense that they 
strove to align vastly different types of groups to work toward the same goals. One 
                                                
33 Author interview Michael Torrey, Torrey and Associates, Washington DC, July 2015.  
34 Author interview with a lobbyist for ConAgra, Washington DC, August 2014; and author interview with 
a lobbyist for a large agricultural producer association, July, 2015.  
35 Author interviews with Chandler Keys, Keys Group, Washington DC, July 2015; Barbra Hiden, 
American Beverage Association, Washington DC, August 2014; a lobbyist for a large agricultural producer 
association, Washington DC July, 2015; and Michael Torrey, Torrey and Associates, Washington DC, July 
2015.  
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example was a coalition headed by the National Beverage Association, and composed of 
“those who advocate for the hungry, the food industry, and retailers.”36  
One committee staffer juxtaposed coalitions in the “old days” with the kinds of 
coalitions forming today on what they termed, “unholy lines.”37 The staffer discussed 
these coalitions as “interesting to watch,” as “you’ve got tax payer groups on the right 
holding hands with environmental groups,” and so on.38 Why are these “unholy” 
coalitions increasingly common? One lobbyist explained:  
“What we’ve found… on addressing issues is that the days of the lone voice are 
over. So we manage or run more than one alliance or coalition. We’ve built these 
things – that’s become our specialty. Managing a coalition or managing a group 
of people is very difficult.”39   
When pressed on why coalitions were a preferable strategy for lobbying, he 
explained that a coalition or alliance gives groups “cover.” In other words, it protects 
groups from being pushed to align too strongly with one partisan side, and gives them a 
broader constituency in Congress and the committees.  
Constituency-based relationships in Congress, in the current environment 
particularly, are key, and an interest group will be best served if they have a “more 
diverse membership.”40 But regardless of how diverse or homogenous their membership 
was, nearly every interest group interviewed spoke about the importance of connecting 
                                                
36 Author interview with Barbra Hiden, American Beverage Association, Washington DC, August 2014.  
37 Author interview with a staff member for the House Agriculture Committee, Washington DC, August 
2014. 
38 Author interview with a staff member for the House Agriculture Committee, Washington DC, August 
2014. 
39 Author interview with a Michael Torrey, Torrey and Associates, Washington DC, July 2015.  
40 Author interview with Ferd Hoefner, National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, Washington DC, 
August 2014.  
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their membership to members of Congress, as did journalists.41 One lobbyist put it 
succinctly:  
“What really makes a difference in this town is not hearing from me or my boss, 
what really makes a difference in this town is when a member of Congress hears 
from farmers, or the people who sell equipment or inputs to those farmers, that’s 
what really makes a difference and that’s who we try to reach out to.”42  
The caveat to all of this is that members of Congress largely do not care about 
hearing from people who have nothing to do with their district or reelection prospects. In 
fact, a few lobbyists viewed contacting members with whom they didn't have 
constituency-based relationships to simply be a waste: “I don’t lobby anybody on Capitol 
Hill unless we have an economic interest in their district… We pay attention to members 
of Congress where we have an economic interest. At least I do. And if you don’t, it’s just 
silly, you just have to.”43 This sentiment strikes at the heart of why coalitions are so 
important for lobbying groups. Groups will not always have a constituency-based 
connection to all of the members of who they might need to influence, and as one 
lobbyist said, “the problem is, if you’re not here and you’re not being represented, just 
plan on getting whacked. Plan on something going wrong, plan on being surprised.”44 
Coalitions provide a broader source of connection and give groups that “cover.”  
Interviews suggested that when a lobbying group has crosscutting, constituency-
based coalitions they become infinitely more influential. Both interest groups and staffers 
recognized that groups were more effective when they worked together to speak on the 
                                                
41 Author interviews with the following people: Barbra Hiden, American Beverage Association, 
Washington DC, August, 2014; Chuck Conner, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, Washington DC, 
August 2014; Ferd Hoefner, National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, Washington DC, August 2014; a 
lobbyist with a large company in the food and beverage category, Washington DC, July 2015; a lobbyist for 
a large agricultural producer association, July, 2015; a food and agricultural journalist for a specialty 
publication; and Robbie Minnich, National Cotton Council, Washington DC, July 2015.  
42 Author interview with a lobbyist for a large agricultural producer association, July, 2015. 
43 Author interview with Chandler Keys, Keys Group, Washington DC, July 2015. 
44 Author interview with Chandler Keys, Keys Group, Washington DC, July 2015. 
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behalf of voters.45 Coalitions can move legislation forward when it is stalling, to push 
legislators (and even interest groups) to come to agreements. For instance, in 2014 a 
coalition of trade associations and producers helped move forward legislation on federal 
food labeling standards.46 Another example of coalitional power in action was the 
National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition’s (NSAC) efforts to restore wetlands through 
environmental legislation:  
“One of our very first victories was the Wetland Reserve Program, this was in the 
1980s. We did a farm tour, we got people who were not seeing eye-to-eye on a 
bus and we went farm to farm and looked at all these different wetlands, and the 
impact of these regulations and whatnot, and that was actually successful in and 
of itself… So we came back and we wrote the wetland reserve and got it 
introduced in Congress, and it became law in 1990… But it all came out of the 
fact that we had both sides of the fence, so to speak, on the same bus looking at 
the same wetlands, discussing regulations.”47 
The National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, in fact, has only become more 
adept at this type of tactic since the 1980s. What makes the NSCA so effective is that 
they use this broad constituency-based membership to overcome partisan divides. Mr. 
Ferd Hoefner, from the NSAC, explained,  
“we want a bill introduced in the House and the Senate at the same time, and we 
want both bills to have both a Republican and a Democratic lead sponsor. And we 
preferably want them on the committee that’s going to deal with it… And as you 
might imagine, it’s increasingly difficult to find the right Democrat and the right 
Republican who actually want to do something together… But that would be our 
preference, most of the time, to have bipartisan lead sponsors and do it in the 
House and the Senate, if not simultaneously, at least in the same year.”48  
                                                
45 Author interviews with Ferd Hoefner, National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, Washington DC, 
August 2014; a Congressional staff member from a heavily agricultural district, Phone Interview, 
September 2015; a lobbyist from a large agribusiness company, Washington DC, July 2015; and Robbie 
Minnich, National Cotton Council, Washington DC, July 2015.  
46 Author interview with a lobbyist from a large agribusiness company, Washington DC, July 2015.  
47 Author interview with Ferd Hoefner, National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, Washington DC, 
August 2014 
48 Author interview with Ferd Hoefner, National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, Washington DC, 
August 2014 
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 This persistence and dedicated strategy has paid off for NSAC. So much so, that 
in the halls of Congress they’ve become something of an insider joke: “we love them, 
[but] toward the end of the process we start to hate them because they’re so persistent. So 
that’s the joke, “oh that’s a Ferd provision – do we have to keep this?”49 Inevitably the 
answer is, “yes, NSAC provisions must be kept” according to the staffer, because they’ll 
be back if the provision isn’t kept! When asked at the end of interviews who else to 
interview, a surprisingly large number of respondents – both lobbyists and staffers alike – 
said to talk to Ferd Hoefner of the NSAC. 
Ultimately, staffers, members of Congress, and committees are receptive to 
influence from groups like the NSAC because these groups speak on the behalf of 
constituency, and because they do a considerable amount of the negotiation and legwork 
that has become so difficult in Congress’s partisan halls. Groups like NSAC were 
allowed, in 2008, to “go line by line through what [the committee] had drafted and ad 
suggestions to that.”50 Interest groups who build a reputation for accuracy, credibility, 
and neutrality find that their access to members and staffers on both sides of the aisle 
expands dramatically, “trust goes a long way in this business. They may completely 
disagree with you, but they may trust that your information is accurate. They might 
disagree with us but they understand that we have thousands of farmer members who 
actually feel this way.”51  
Successful lobbying groups become adept at avoiding the appearance of partisan 
alliances, and at negotiating between members who often vehemently oppose one 
                                                
49 Author interview with a staff member for the House Agriculture Committee, Washington DC, August 
2014. 
50 Author interview with a staff member for the House Agriculture Committee, Washington DC, August 
2014. 
51 Author interview with Ferd Hoefner, National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, Washington DC, 
August 2014.  
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another, and above all, not giving up on members who appear intractable. One lobbyist 
explained that, “this is crazy business. You never know for sure where people are going 
to come from. I could cite you numerous examples where [you think], “wow, I can’t 
believe he did that.” So you never totally give up on anybody. It’s part of good 
transparency, good courtesy.”52  Developing a reputation as someone who doesn’t give 
up on an issue just because it’s challenging is just as key as representing a member’s 
constituents; “The thing that’s really important in this town is that the people you’re 
talking to know you aren’t going to rest… If every morning you’re going to get up and 
run this rabbit to the hole, they’re more apt to talk to you.”53 
In sum, interest groups and lobbyists who persistently provide accurate and 
reputable information, who speak for a voting-constituency, and who overcome partisan 
divisions are the most influential groups on the Hill. Partisanship and uncertainty have 
created a hostile environment for many groups, yet, those who are able to develop cross-
cutting coalitions, speak for broad constituencies, and develop reputations as persistent 
non-partisan negotiators have found themselves flourishing.  
CONCLUSIONS  
The interviews discussed here and others, whose quotes did not end up in text, 
illustrate that partisanship, as predicted, has had a considerable impact on interest group 
lobbying. It has required groups to increase their legislative efforts and engage in more 
coalition building between themselves and with members of Congress, a difficult task. 
Constituency-based relationships with members of relevant committees are key for 
influence, as is the ability to bridge partisan divides between members.  
                                                
52 Author interview with Chuck Conner, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, Washington DC, 
August 2014.  
53 Author interview with Chandler Keys, Keys Group, Washington DC, July 2015. 
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These interviews suggest that partisanship, combined with electoral incentives, 
create a Congressional environment in which interest groups are allowed increasing 
influence over legislation, and where they play a large role in negotiating between 
members who once might have simply walked across the hall and spoken to each other. 
Interest groups who establish reputations as reliable, trustworthy, and factual reportedly 
gain more access to members of Congress and have better success at achieving their 
legislative priorities. But reputation takes considerable time and effort to build, and not 
all corporations or interest groups can afford to maintain a continual presence on the Hill 
(Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Mathur and Singh 2011). This creates an uneven playing 
field even for groups who have yet to overcome the collective action barrier and intend to 
engage in political advocacy. One way that groups are able to overcome this barrier is 
coalition building.   
Not only do coalitions help interest groups overcome the financial barriers to 
lobbying, they also allow interest groups to present a united front of consensus and 
support to members of Congress, and to help move legislation forward that might 
otherwise have stalled and failed. By formulating internal consensus between each other, 
and bridging traditional industry or party divisions, interest groups allow members of 
Congress to work across the aisle on issue that otherwise might have become overly 
partisan and resulted in gridlock.  
The increasing importance of crosscutting coalition in the face of partisanship 
suggests an important avenue for future research. In particular, scholars should try to 
measure the relative effectiveness of differing kinds of coalitions in order to understand 
the role that they play in the legislative process, particularly under partisan conditions.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The goal of this dissertation was to discover the lobbying strategies that interest 
groups adopt based on their own characteristics and in response to the changing political 
climate. I began with the premise that interest groups are rational actors who lobby in the 
manner that they believe will be the most effective for achieving their political goals. I 
found that interest group strategies depend on the financial capacity of the group and their 
relationship to members of Congress on relevant committees. I also found that interest 
groups are adapting to Congressional polarization by drastically increasing their lobbying 
efforts in that venue and scaling back in other venues.  
The dissertation began by asserting the importance of food and agricultural policy 
as a area for study, both because of it’s relevance to everyday American life, and because 
the subsystem is in a particular moment of flux – the agricultural policy landscape is 
beginning to shift in response to the polarization that has been gripping the rest of 
Congress since the 1990s.  
Chapter 2 situated the dissertation in the larger body of literature on subsystems 
and lobbying. This chapter reviewed the social science on lobbying strategies, from 
venue shopping to informational subsidy theory. And, using these findings as a starting 
point, I theorized that interest groups would be constrained in their strategic options by 
their financial resources and by their ability to speak to members of Congress as 
representatives of a constituency. I also reviewed research on conflict expansion and 
polarization, and in doing so pushed the literature forward to hypothesize what 
polarization will mean for interest group lobbying behavior. I argued here that 
polarization would increase lobbying in Congress for two reasons: 1) polarization 
increases uncertainty, forcing interest groups to invest more money keeping abreast of 
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politics; and 2) polarization decreases the capacity of members of Congress to strike 
grand bargains and compromise with one another, creating new opportunity for interest 
groups to fill new roles as mediators between members, and thus increasing their 
influence over the policy process.  
To test these theories, Chapter 3 looks at a subset of lobbying firms. In this 
chapter I build an original dataset, combining LDA reports with Compustat firm-level 
data and political variables, such as an average of the DW-NOMINATE scores for the 
House and Senate for each year. Using this dataset, I show that polarization is increasing 
lobbying in Congress for all firms, and for smaller firms it is causing corresponding 
decreases in agency lobbying. I also show that firm capacity, combined with 
constituency-based relationships to members of Congress cause a considerable shift in 
lobbying priorities for those firms whose revenue falls at or below the mean revenue in 
the dataset – those firms who fall at or below the mean revenue, and who have a 
relatively higher combination of both revenue and constituency-based relationships lobby 
Congress more heavily than those who do not have this combination. In other words, 
smaller firms are forced to be particularly strategic in their advocacy strategies, and all 
firms are responding to polarization with a considerable increase in their attention to 
Congress.  
Chapter 4 tests the effect of polarization on a broader dataset, including all groups 
who reported lobbying in the agriculture sector between 1998 and 2013. This dataset, 
again, is constructed using LDA data combined, to which I add political variables. 
Chapter 4 confirms that across the board – among all lobbying groups, from corporations, 
to interest groups, to unions, to local governments – polarization drastically increases 
lobbying in Congress, and drives down agency lobbying. Interest groups, separated out 
from corporations, are particularly responsive to polarization in their venue selection. 
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Interest groups are far more inclined to lobby Congress as polarization increases, and less 
inclined to lobby the bureaucracy. This may be because many of these interest groups 
exist for the sole purpose of political advocacy, and are therefore even more attuned and 
responsive to political change.   
Both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 show that the climate in Washington has a 
considerable impact on the strategies that interest groups use in their political advocacy. 
However, LDA data indicates only what interest groups are doing, and not why they are 
doing it. These chapters can only guess at the motivations behind increasing lobbying 
efforts in Congress and reducing lobbying of the bureaucracy.  
In order to better understand the true effect that polarization is having on lobbying 
strategy, Chapter 5 uses a series of interviews to dig into the strategic decisions of groups 
lobbying on the 2008 farm bill and other food and agriculture legislation. This chapter 
highlights the importance of coalition forming under polarized conditions, and how these 
coalitions can be highly influential. Interviewees described acting as policy mediators and 
negotiators; in the process of forming a coalition, interest groups spent considerable time 
negotiating their preferred policy, so that the coalition could present a united front to 
Congressional committee members. In doing so, they essentially wrote policy before 
bringing it to members of Congress then presented the policy as a palatable solution to 
some perceived problem. By negotiating amongst themselves prior to lobbying Congress, 
coalitions were often able to make the polarized political process easier on lawmakers. A 
particularly diverse or crosscutting coalition made it easier for legislators to co-author 
with members of the opposite party and to support legislation that they might otherwise 
have been uncertain about.  
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CONTRIBUTIONS  
This dissertation makes two primary methodological contributions to political 
science, and in doing so aims to substantively push the field forward in understanding 
lobbying and it’s effects on public policy.  
First, this dissertation is the first to ask business literature on corporate lobbying, 
political science literatures on lobbying and subsystems, and the literature on polarization 
to speak to each other. As such, it combines the strengths of these literatures to move 
political science further toward a deep understanding of lobbying strategy. In isolating 
firms for study, I show that corporate characteristics constrain and enable distinct 
approaches toward political advocacy. Then, moving beyond firms, I show that all 
interest groups (including firms) are adapting their strategies to become more effective in 
a polarized environment.  
Second, in order to offer new insight into what strategies interest groups are using 
to achieve their preferred political outcomes and how they are changing these strategies 
in response to the rapidly shifting political climate of Washington, I use a multi-method 
approach that is rare in the lobbying literature. I combine cross-sectional time series data 
with a series of interviews to flesh out our collective understanding of lobbying behavior. 
I find that by adjusting to polarization in Congress, lobbyists may be more powerful than 
ever before. 
Together these contributions result in a substantive theoretical advancement of the 
field’s understanding of lobbying strategy and interest group responsiveness. The 
findings of this dissertation suggest several avenues for future research.  
FUTURE RESEARCH  
This dissertation highlights several areas for additional exploration. Scholarly 
work often becomes segregated – scholarship on subsystems rarely converses with that 
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on Congressional polarization or on corporate lobbying. In putting these literatures in 
conversation with each other, this dissertation begins the process of understanding how a 
changing, polarizing political environment forces American interest groups to alter their 
strategies for political advocacy. I show clearly that corporations and interest groups are 
changing their strategies for political advocacy in response to polarization. However, 
while I assert that this is a result of subsystem breakdown occurring in response to 
polarization, I do not prove that polarization is, in fact, breaking down subsystems. 
Though the behavior of interest groups clearly indicates that subsystems are changing, 
the argument that they are breaking down bears further research to describe exactly how 
subsystems are altering in response to polarization.  
Chapter 5 of this dissertation explores the importance and utility of coalitional 
advocacy. This chapter shows that interest groups and their lobbyists view coalitions as 
the most effective way to effect policy change and to overcome obstacles presented by 
Congressional polarization. The relative effectiveness of coalitional groups, as compared 
to single-group advocacy, bears further exploration. In particular, future research should 
consider the specific benefits of crosscutting coalition groups in overcoming legislative 
opposition. Are coalitional groups comprised of non-traditional allies (such as hunger 
advocates and the beverage industry; or farmers and environmentalists) more effective at 
overcoming opposition to their policy goals than other kinds of groups? The interviews in 
this dissertation suggest that they likely are.  
These are just a few of the directions in which future research might move. This 
dissertation suggests that there is far more to learn about the internal mechanics of 
lobbying strategies and how interest groups adapt to a rapidly changing political world.   
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Appendix A: Code Book 
 “Firm” is any for profit company/organization 
 
“Interest Group” covers all professional associations, producer associations, alliances, 
and other organizations  
 
“Local government” includes local government offices and bureaus, and municipal utility 
districts and other public utilities 
“Other,” a country; individual; or group that cannot be identified  
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